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T h e purpose of this essay is to contribute to the 
discussion of Latin American industrialization from 
the standpoint of manufacturing prospects and the 
long-term options which can be glimpsed within the 
framework of economic and social development ob-
jectives. 
In order to accomplish this goal, we must first of 
all descr ibe the terms in which industrialization is 
be ing discussed, since it is well known that the re-
vision of the ideas which for decades inspired the 
industrial policy of most Latin American countries, 
together with the changes in world economic trends, 
are giving rise to positions or projections of undeni-
able importance for the future. 
Next, it is necessary to define quite precisely the 
region's industrial profile, noting the various trends 
and situations in the different countries, since the 
future of industry will also b e quite heterogeneous. 
It is also necessary to describe the basic common 
traits of Latin American industrialization, which are 
rooted in the region's history, prevailing political 
framework and location in the world and its ties 
—notably those of a cultural, political, economic and 
technological nature— with the developed Western 
economies, all of which helps to shape a develop-
ment style reflecting those traits which together 
define an overall Latin American industrialization 
model transcending the heterogeneity mentioned 
above. 
Finally, it is necessary to review the main 
schemes or scenarios behind the industrial debate, 
aside from prevailing trends, attempting to show the 
areas of common ground and divergence of the 
various positions and to collect useful elements for 
an evaluation in each case. 
*Except where otherwise indicated, the figures used to 
illustrate various concepts are from CEPAL, which draws its 
information from the official sources of the Latin American 
countries, or from United Nations publications when refer-
ring to other areas of the world. The author, however, takes 
full responsibility for their use, especially as some of them 
appear in works which have not yet been published or are 
being revised, and consequently have not been approved by 
the Secretariat. 
**Staff member of the CEPAL/UNIDO Joint Industrial 
Development Division. 
I 
General terms of the debate 
In discussing Latin American industrialization, 
one can easily succumb to either of two op-
posing temptations; one, to exalt manufac-
turing growth and the atmosphere of moderni-
ty, or industrial atmosphere, which it has 
created and which promises to lead to more 
advanced stages; and the other, to focus rather 
on the problems of this sector and those of a 
general nature which Latin American indus-
trialization has not helped to solve, or which in 
some respects it has even accentuated. In most 
cases, however, efforts are made to keep both 
positions in perspective, since industry has 
he lped to make the region's economic expan-
sion possible and to incorporate the techno-
logical progress of the centres, as well as to 
make Latin American economic growth more 
self-sustaining and consequently to generate 
the ability to react to external economic turbu-
lence.1 We must add that there are some less 
widely held views, inspired by specific and 
sometimes opposing political ideologies, 
which for various reasons reject the entire 
previous industrial history, and others wherein 
criticism, especially on the part of Northern 
economists, holds up as examples Asian mod-
els oriented towards assembly industries, im-
ports and re-exports based on the 'advantages' 
of low wages. 
Whatever the focus of the discussion, the 
industrialization strategy per se does not 
appear to be judged unduly harshly or exten-
sively, as may be seen from most intellectual 
opinions and the majority of official pronounce-
ments at the technical and political levels in the 
countries of the region, as well as the positions. 
of the governments in international forums 
where the subject is discussed, where they in-
sistently stress the urgent need to co-operate 
for industrial development. This is the case 
despi te the fact that industrialization is being 
quest ioned as a motor for development and that 
the industrial efforts of some countries are con-
sequently being weakened through political 
changes towards conservative, and sometimes 
1 Enr ique V. Iglesias, "Latin America and the external 
turbulence" , in CEPAL Review, second half of 1976. 
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extreme, positions based, inter alia, on easy 
external indebtedness largely made possible 
by the new easy availability of financial flows 
from private sources, albeit on 'hard' terms. 
This was perhaps inevitable in the light of 
international experience, wherein in general, 
and with some conspicuous and explicable ex-
ceptions, the quality of development and the 
per capita income level clearly have a positive 
relationship to the weight of industry in the 
economy and the degree of advancement of the 
manufacturing sector in such areas as its struc-
ture, technological level and competitiveness 
in more complex categories. 
The validity of the industrialization thesis 
is implicitly in doubt, however, when 'open' 
economic policies aimed, inter alia, at 
attracting foreign competition are applied or 
discussed, because indiscriminate openness 
toward imports may or may not lead to indus-
trialization in specific circumstances since, at 
least in its purest version, it has no precon-
ceived objectives regarding economic struc-
ture, resource allocation tending to be based on 
comparative advantages and on free market 
forces. 
Thus, in most cases industrialization is not 
directly threatened in conceptual and political 
discussions, at least according to what we know 
from the official statements of Latin American 
governments, including those which are mov-
ing the furthest towards extremely 'open* eco-
nomic positions (Chile and Panama, for exam-
ple). It is a completely different matter, how-
ever, as regards the industrial patterns or 
models, and even more so the economic policy 
and machinery, designed to achieve the objec-
tives of development and industrialization. 
Here is where the most important socio-eco-
nomic and political aspects come in, economic 
'openness', for example, being an option dia-
metrically opposed to that of 'de-linking', to 
the strategy of collective efforts within integra-
tion schemes, and to models aimed at meeting 
the population's basic needs, both in their pa-
ternalistic version and that linked to develop-
ment, or even a new style. Whatever the case, it 
is easy to see the importance of the different 
political commitments entailed in the various 
positions. Similarly, it is obvious that such 
options may have a strong and differing influ-
ence on industrial patterns, or simply require 
different roles from the manufacturing sector. 
Thus, the industrial debate tends to fall 
within the sphere of various strategies covering 
all aspects of economic and social affairs and 
often quite contradictory political positions. It 
is consequently recognized, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that industrialization is not an end in 
itself, that it depends upon fundamental eco-
nomic and socio-political options which indus-
try reinforces rather than initiates, and that a 
specific industrial policy's room for manoeu-
vring within a given economic and socio-politi-
cal framework is therefore subject to restric-
tions which can be fairly severe.2 
At this point it is easy to confuse what may 
be called the industrialization model or pattern 
—defined by such aspects as the basis of its 
dynamism, the productive structure, technolo-
gy, and foreign trade in manufactures— with 
the economic and social policy which nour-
ishes the model or from which its essential 
traits stem, keeping in mind the influence of 
local conditions such as the size of the market 
and the availability of natural resources. This 
confusion is often expressed in the ambiguity 
of the term 'strategy': at times this applies to 
the model, at others to the economic and social 
policy, and sometimes to all of these things or to 
limited, specific aspects such as the technolog-
ical or protectionist strategy. 
As far as the industrialization model is con-
cerned, what is kept in mind is frequently the 
industrial position reached in most of the de-
veloped countries, either individually or in 
blocs or groups (North America, EEC, EFTA, 
the centrally planned European economies, 
Japan), which have the highest levels of in-
come and general well-being. This is espe-
cially the case when certain essential simi-
larities are observed, despite differences in the 
political system. 
The principal similarities to be seen are 
the high level of industrialization, the diver-
sified and vertically linked industrial structure, 
2These,ideas are supported, for example, in United 
Nations, Committee for Devefopment Planning, Report on 
the Tenth Session, March/April 1974 (ECOSOC official 
records, 57th Session, Supplement No. 4). 
THE INDUSTRIALIZATION DEBATE IN LATIN AMEHICA/Hrfcior Soza 3 7 
the technological development efforts, the lo-
cation in large national and/or international 
markets and the advanced manufacturing ex-
port patterns. Obviously there are differences, 
such as those connected with trade in manufac-
tures: the great openness of the Western Euro-
pean economies, especially in their trade with 
each other, through intra-sectoral special-
ization schemes; the closed strategy of the 
group of centrally planned economies; and 
Japan's very marked barriers against manufac-
tured imports. 
Despite these discrepancies, the impor-
tance of the similarities between the industrial 
models of the developed economies and of the 
fact that these models have been implemented 
according to differing political, social and 
economic strategies is undeniable, but this 
does not conflict with the limitations affecting a 
specific industrial policy within a given frame-
work, since the models were developed under 
different historical circumstances. Such cir-
cumstances include the backwardness of some 
countries with respect to industrialization and 
development which, depending upon the se-
verity of the lag, has historically demanded 
deliberate, increasingly intensive efforts 
conditioned by fairly dissimilar cultural and 
value systems, as well as specific political 
positions compatible with the primary devel-
opment objectives and with the goal, often 
implicit, of catching up with the more ad-
vanced economies and societies. It should be 
noted that among the basic explanations for the 
above-mentioned similarities are the charac-
teristics of world technological progress, to 
which all-important reason is added the rivalry 
for power, especially among the major hege-
monic powers. 
Accordingly, recourse is often had to the 
solution of comparing Latin American results 
with the industrial characteristics of the de-
veloped economies, which become a sort of 
shining example in the long-term horizon. But 
those who discuss industrialization are increas-
ingly leaning towards a search for sui generis 
methods, since the 'shining example' itself is 
now being reviewed for social and economic 
reasons, especially as a result of the upheaval 
within the developed capitalist economies 
after 1973-1974, when the energy problem 
revealed significant structural problems, and 
since the enthusiastic efforts made to repro-
duce this example have run into stubborn diffi-
culties. This search, which stems from the idea 
that an industrial theory should be formulated 
for the developing countries wherein the 
manufacturing sector might play a different 
role from that which it plays in the centres, 
often forms part of the discussion of develop-
ment styles and, naturally, the consideration 
of the political commitments which would be 
inherent in significant changes in the prevail-
ing trends. 
With regard to styles, one frequently en-
counters the question of the extent to which 
they are really factors exogenous to industrial-
ization, and consequently whether different 
manufacturing patterns can become the stim-
ulus for differing development styles. Despite 
the foregoing statements about the economic 
and socio-political framework of industry, the 
subject is not unimportant, nor is the answer 
easy. For example, taken from a historical view-
point it seems indubitable that technological 
innovation and the corresponding industrial-
ization played a decisive role in shaping the 
consumer style of the advanced capitalist 
societies in accordance, naturally, with their 
patterns of accumulation. It is equally certain 
that industrialization in Latin America has 
played its part in significant economic and 
social transformations. Thus, it would not be 
correct to state that manufacturing develop-
ment is totally without influence among the 
major variables which help to define a style. 
Nevertheless, following the reasoning of 
Carlos Matus,3 we must single out what he calls 
the 'dynamic conjuncture', a concept which 
he explains using precisely the example of the 
start of Latin American industrialization on the 
basis of domestic markets, stating that "it can 
be a force unleashed from abroad which reveals 
prospects for dynamic industrial growth, with-
out any social group... having formulated them 
previously as a project...". A different matter is 
his concept of 'constructed policy', which is 
3 Carlos Matus, Estrategia y plan, Editorial Universi-
taria, Santiago, Chile/Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico City, 
Santiago, Chile, 1972. 
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that of formulations based on "ideas which in 
turn are based on a specific theory or model". 
Thus, it is obvious that ex post analysis of 
industrialization models and development 
styles is by nature entirely distinct from that 
which may be done ex ante. 
In both cases, however, it must be recog-
nized that outstanding political ingredients or 
definitions are involved. This is why in con-
sidering Latin American industrialization one 
may easily note that the political reactions to 
the crisis of 1930 varied throughout the coun-
tries of the region, which helps to explain why 
some tended to industrialize and others dit not, 
until the industrialization strategy became 
general after the Second World War, and espe-
cially during the 1950s, in a sequence which 
gradually gave political legitimacy to the fun-
damental significance of industrialization as a 
dynamic factor and one of the ways of incor-
porating world technological progress.4 
These facts are mentioned simply to 
emphasize that even the dynamic conjuncture, 
which according to Matus "imposes itself upon 
men", required certain socio-political bases 
and an ideological and intellectual maturation 
process in order to express itself in industrial 
realities. This process, which gradually en-
compassed the entire region, sought to improve 
the industrialization process by introducing a 
greater degree of rationality, integration agree-
ments to give it sufficient scope, and policies to 
facilitate exports. Itmustalsobeacknowledged 
that the opportunities for real expression were 
supported by previous situations, such as the 
chance which the industrialization process it-
self gave some countries to reap profit from the 
world economic boom which ended in 1973-
1974, and which largely supported the dynamic 
conjuncture that led to sharp increases in 
manufactured exports, in addition to the posi-
tion won, in line with the predominant eco-
nomic and socio-political schemes, by the for-
4 For over 30 years, CEPAL has argued extensively 
about this significance of industrialization. In the Eco-
nomic Survey of Latin America, 1949, it already empha-
sized the subject strongly, according to paragraphs later 
reproduced in Desarrollo, industrialización y comercio ex-
terior, in Cuadernos de la CEPAL, No. 13, Santiago, Chile, 
1977. 
eign transnational corporations, which are 
noteworthy among agents for such exports, in 
contrast to what took place in Japan, for 
example. 
The policy constructed on the basis of 
ideas is very different, as may be seen by 
looking at international and Latin American 
experience, wherein the sharper the change, 
the more drastic the political commitment 
required. This is virtually self-evident, con-
vincing and outstanding examples in the re-
gional framework being such dissimilar cases 
as Cuba and Chile, or Nicaragua and Uruguay. 
For these reasons, there are serious doubts 
as to whether industry itself can be the stimulus 
for very different development styles, although 
it must be acknowledged that the industrial 
events give rise to subsequent situations of 
change which may tend to modify the eco-
nomic and social structures, without neces-
sarily implying trends toward profound alter-
ations in style such as those which are being 
suggested as regards the basic needs of the 
population or the importance of preserving the 
environment and saving energy. 
In this connexion it must be kept in mind 
that the concept of style is frequently used 
vaguely and very esoterically with respect to 
the ideological and political support bases. For 
this reason, in an illuminating article on the 
unified approach to development, Jorge Gra-
ciarena explains that "... politics reappears... 
as a central component of any conception of 
styles of development. The values may vary, 
but styles must distinguish and decide as 
regards how much, how, what and for whom, 
since these are the alternatives normally facing 
a development process and the choice rests 
with the political order. The function of choos-
ing between them is institutionalized, and it is 
the business of the political apparatus, more 
than of any other institutional order, to choose 
the direction of development and promote 
progress along the chosen path".5 
When the matter is put in these terms, anal-
yses of the Latin American industrialization 
process and of its prospects and options may be 
5 Jorge Graciarena, "Power and development styles", 
in CEPAL Review, first half of 1976, p. 191. 
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placed in the field of concrete socio-political 
realities and not, as often occurs, in an esoteric 
framework which consists of the belief that at 
any given moment industrial policy was or will 
be given numerous options. External events 
which have been so closely linked with indus-
trial policy over the last decades and which will 
probably have a profound impact in the future 
or must be included when considering optional 
strategies must also be considered. 
Furthermore, we must recognize that re-
trospective analysis is valid to the extent that it 
makes a critical analysis of past experience in 
its projections for the future. At this point, 
perhaps we should explain that this analysis 
usually takes place within the historical frame-
work of an industrial strategy taking the form of 
a trajectory aimed at establishing support bases 
for other stages or methods put forward with a 
view to and in accordance with superior social 
objectives. Thus, judgement of the suitability 
of forms of industrialization is directed towards 
prospective long-term trends. 
In connexion with these approaches, it 
may be worthwhile to recall that the first stages 
of the industrialization of the developed West-
ern capitalist economies were by no means 
easy, nor were they reached without huge 
social sacrifices. This also occurred in the so-
cialist economies of Europe after the Second 
World War, until they reached and industrial 
standing and level of income similar to those in 
Western Europe, and in Japan, when its indus-
trial recovery began, inter alia, with modest 
steps in the export of manufactures. The assem-
bly for re-export model of some Asian countries 
with cheap labour might be seen in similar 
terms. But all this in no way means that Latin 
America must necessarily repeat these experi-
ences, since the region has already made fair 
progress in industry and is able to use to its 
advantage the technological progress of the 
developed countries (as it is doing to a large 
extent, although not always in suitable condi-
tions); appropiate co-operation can be ex-
pected from the developed countries, and in 
practice is being sought in an increasingly inte-
grated manner, without prejudice to the over-
whelming importance of Latin America's own 
efforts. 
With respect to the chronological aspect, 
it may be wondered whether Latin America 
really had an option for developing its industry 
other than that which emerged, so to speak, 
naturally, in view of its internal political re-
strictions as well as those inherent in its ex-
ternal ties and in the functioning of the world 
economy, especially in the developed western 
area, to say nothing of the problems posed by 
the fact that it began its industrialization late in 
a context of underdeveloped economies with 
limited infrastructural facilities and entrepre-
neurial, scientific and technical vocations, 
among many other factors. 
In so far as the answer is no, any evaluation 
of the Latin American industrialization model 
will mean confronting it with a retrospective 
utopia. Analysis is obviously useful, however, 
if it focusses on projections for the future, the 
principal development problems, and the eco-
nomic and social objectives to which indus-
trialization may contribute. 
The domestic and external economic 
framework, as well as the socio-political con-
text of industrialization, must still be kept in 
mind, however. It has been said that this means 
that industry cannot be considered as having a 
very high degree of autonomy, although one 
can easily find areas where specific industrial 
policy actions have had a noteworthy impact, as 
demonstrated by the industrial history of the 
countries of the region. To a large extent, how-
ever, these very actions are determined by eco-
nomic and political factors. For example, in the 
large as well as most of the medium-sized coun-
tries of the region, the development of many 
basic industries was associated with direct ac-
tions by the public sector within the framework 
of economic and political conceptions which 
give the State a protagonistic role and have also 
led to extensive nationalization and to regula-
tions reserving basic, strategic areas for the 
State. Certainly, these positions have been re-
vised in some countries, but it is equally certain 
that in others the real changes have not been 
too drastic, since the conditions which justified 
direct State intervention remain. 
Just the opposite has taken place in the 
small countries, where only in exceptional 
cases has a basic industry developed. In them, 
the economic-political option which, through 
integration, would have made an industrial 
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model similar to that of the larger countries 
viable did not materialize, as may be easily 
seen from the ideological assumptions which 
gave rise to the integraion agreements. 
These comments on the general terms of 
the Latin American industrial debate, concep-
tually placed within its historical, economic 
and socio-political context, are inadequate, 
however, unless some of the principal ap-
proaches, schemes or scenarios wherein this 
discussion is usually placed are specified or 
thoroughly analysed. 
Firstly, the principal traits of the Latin 
American industrial profile and its trends must 
be defined, since the discussion is based on a 
critical analysis of this background and seeks 
new perspectives largely in relation to it. 
Next, we must examine the normative hori-
zon of industry in the mature economies, since 
the debate often compares the process of Latin 
American industrialization with that of those 
economies, and many of the analyses support 
the imitative nature of this process, although 
that imitation is certainly incomplete in some 
important respects. We must also define the 
Latin American position, wherein trends to-
ward abandoning the hypothetical norm may 
be noted. 
We must then touch upon the industrial 
significance of the trends towards restructuring 
the world economy and their implications for 
the revival of manufacturing activities and, 
consequently, for the international division of 
labour, since it is contended that such trends 
are very marked and viewpoints trusting or 
mistrusting in their benefits for the region 
abound in the debate. 
It also seems necessary to analyse the ideas 
for Latin America discussed in connexion with 
the formulation of the United Nations Interna-
tional Development Strategy for the 1980s: 
ideas which draw upon the values of the norma-
tive horizon in the context of co-operation and 
the New International Economic Order, and 
which figure prominently in the discussions in 
international forums. 
It is also useful to consider the surge to-
wards economic openness which is tending to 
emerge in some countries because, although it 
does not correspond to specific industrial posi-
tions, openness does have an impact on the 
manufacturing sector, and in the Latin Ameri-
can debate it holds a predominant position in 
certain contexts and countries. 
Finally, attention must be paid to the pro-
posals for outward-oriented industrial strate-
gies which contrast notably with the other 
positions on external relationships and, more-
over, specifically pursue and generally give 
high priority to urgent social objectives. 
Actually, isolating these six approaches is 
in many cases somewhat artificial, since they 
often contain common points or overlapping or 
coinciding areas. To some extent, consequent-
ly, the distinction may be viewed as a method-
ological device designed to clarify the options 
or positions which are most often discussed, 
together with the commitments they imply. 
II 
The industrial profile and trends 
1. Industrial dynamism 
Over the past thirty years, Latin American in-
dustry has expanded at an average rate of 6.7% 
per year, whereas world industry did so at a rate 
of only 5.9% annually. Thus, the region's indus-
trial weight in the world increased from less 
than 4% to close to 5%. More noteworthy, how-
ever, is the fact that the region's manufacturing 
weight among the Western market economies 
climbed from 4.7% to 8.4% as a result of Latin 
America's relatively rapid industrial growth, 
North America's slow growth (3.6% annually), 
and the slack pace of Western Europe's growth 
(5.2% annually). 
This fact deserves to be emphasized, since 
it indicates the industrialization effort in-
volved, the scale of which can be properly 
appreciated if it is kept in mind that Latin 
America's external links are essentially with 
these developed market economies of moder-
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ate economic expansion. Thus, the region's 
total gross domestic product climbed at a rate of 
5.5% per year, while North America's did so at 
3.6% and Western Europe's at a rate of 4.3% 
annually. 
It may accordingly be concluded that there 
has been a certain autonomous dynamism in 
Latin American development which is ex-
pressed even in the muted effects on the re-
gion's economy of the recession undergone by 
the developed market countries after 1973-
1974;6 according to most of the analyses, this is 
all linked with the industrial progress of recent 
decades, which provided impetus for growth 
and an increased capacity to resist external 
vicissitudes, in addition to tending to mitigate 
the deterioration of the primary commodity-ex-
port situation. 
The industrial dynamism of Latin America 
can also be observed by comparing the rates of 
expansion of manufacturing versus overall eco-
nomic activity, the ratio of 1.22 (industrial-
ization process) being somewhat higher than 
the world average (1.20) over the past three 
decades and significantly higher than the rate 
for the developed market economies as a whole 
(1.11), although it was lower than that of the 
socialist countries (1.40) and Japan (1.48), 
whose strategies were intensively industrialist 
within rapid economic expansion schemes. 
These figures on the region mask large dif-
ferences in dynamism among the countries 
making it up, however. Eight countries 
equalled or exceeded the average economic 
expansion rate (Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Panama and 
the Dominican Republic); nine exceeded the 
overall industrial growth rate (the same 
countries mentioned above plus Honduras), 
and only six countries (Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, Bolivia, Haiti and Paraguay) had slow 
6 O n e indicator of this muted effect is the overall per-
formance of industry in the developed market economies 
since 1973 in comparison with that of Latin America. In the 
former, manufacturing output dropped in 1974 and espe-
cially in 1975, and the average rate of industrial expansion 
from 1973 to the end of the decade was 1.1% annually, 
whereas in Latin America on the whole, output never 
dropped, and the average rate of industrial growth during 
the period was 4.8% per year. Manufacturing output de-
creased noticeably only in Argentina and Chile, but this 
was primarily for domestic political and economic reasons. 
rates of industrial expansion when compared 
with the world average (5.9%). These six 
countries were also those which recorded some 
of the lowest economic growth rates. Despite 
these exceptions, however, one may still hold 
the view that relatively vigorous industrial 
dynamism was general throughout the region.7 
All the same, if Brazil and Mexico are excluded 
from the calculations, the average rate of 
industrial expansion drops from 6.7% to no 
more than 5.0% annually, principally due to the 
slow economic and industrial growth of Argen-
tina, whose weight was significant at mid-
century (31% in 1950, but only 16.6% in 1979). 
These facts not only illustrate the dif-
ferences in dynamism within the region but 
also highlight the fact that, generally, the 
countries with the greatest overall economic 
expansion had the highest industrial growth 
indexes; this corresponds to international 
experience, to which there have been very few 
exceptions, and those have generally been for 
very specific reasons. The reasons for this and 
for the fact that economic growth tends to 
coincide with more rapid industrial expansion 
(industrialization process) are well known in 
development theory, and this is not the place to 
refer to them. It is more useful to continue 
discussing the problem of heterogeneity, 
which goes far beyond the dynamism problem, 
and whose projections will be felt in the future. 
Obviously, industrial heterogeneity 
within the region has been noticeable from 
very early on, so that the 1930 crisis found the 
countries in fairly varied positions. There is no 
doubt that the largest and some medium-sized 
countries were more favourably placed for 
pursuing decisive industrialization processes 
and dealing with the unfavourable conditions 
in the world economy and international trade 
affecting their primary export products and the 
need to recover, maintain or increase the 
population's levels of employment and 
income. In general terms, the countries with 
the easiest import possibilities, the narrowest 
markets, or political positions incompatible 
with industrialization were most backward in 
^Overall industrial dynamism is best measured by the 
simple arithmetic mean of average rates of manufacturing 
growth in the countries, which comes to 6.1% annually. 
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the development of manufacturing, which 
penetrated the entire region as a strategy only 
after the Second World War. 
Around 1950, manufacturing's weight in 
the Latin America economy was 20% (currently 
26%), but only Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay exceeded this figure, while Mexico 
was on the edge of it, the other countries being 
far behind in their industrial development. If 
the countries are categorized as large, medium-
sized and small, the differing average indus-
trial situations of each group emerge clearly. 
For that period, however, we cannot say that 
there was a marked correspondence between 
size of market, degree of industrialization and 
level of income. Only the small countries, with 
their modest levels of income and low degrees 
of industrialization, came close to demonstra-
ting this association. In the case of the large 
and medium-sized countries the situation was 
more complicated, and consequently the 
averages reveal little. Other elements would 
have to be introduced into the analysis, such as 
the availability and degree of exploitation of 
natural resources, while it must also be taken 
into account that at that stage of industrial 
development the size of the market was 
perhaps not an unduly severe limitation, since 
a large portion of the manufacturing output fell 
into the categories of non-durable consumer 
goods, which are sometimes called traditional, 
and where the requirements in terms of scale, 
technologies and capital were frequently 
smaller. In other categories, little progress had 
been made and, certainly, activities of little 
complexity were involved. 
Subsequently, the influence of the size of 
the market begins to emerge more clearly, 
since many countries entered more advanced 
stages of manufacturing development, with 
industries requiring broader markets and 
bigger technological and capital bases. This 
influence is partially reflected by the fact that 
the large countries increased their degree of 
industrialization by 32% from 1950 to 1978, 
whereas the medium-sized ones did so only by 
18%. It was the small countries, however, 
which made the relatively greatest industrial 
effort, since they increased their degree of 
industrialization by 50%, although of course 
they began with an extremely small manufac-
turing sector and passed through the simplest 
stages of industrialization. Nevertheless, on 
the whole they failed to match the industrial 
indexes which had been recorded by the large 
countries in 1950, although they slightly sur-
passed those registered by the medium-sized 
countries at that time. 
As stated earlier, the dynamism with 
which these changes took place differs greatly 
among the countries. For example, the large 
countries tended to increase their industrial 
weight within the region due to the rapid ex-
pansion of Brazil and, to a lesser extent, 
Mexico, and despite the fact that Argentina, 
which sharply increased its degree of indus-
trialization, did so within a context of only slow 
economic growth. The medium-sized coun-
tries (especially Chile and Uruguay) lost much 
ground, although Peru and especially Vene-
zuela were among those whose expansion was 
relatively rapid. Industry in the small countries 
more or less maintained its weight in the 
region, and in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and Panama industry grew faster than the Latin 
American average. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the gener-
al lines of the differences between the indus-
trial patterns of the large, medium-sized and 
small countries were broadly maintained. 
Around 1950, the degree of industrialization of 
the medium-sized countries as a whole (17%) 
was 77% of that of the large countries (22%), 
and that of the small countries was 55% thereof 
(12%). In 1978, the degree of industrialization 
of the medium-sized countries (20%) had 
dropped to 69% of that of the large countries 
(29%), and that of the small countries had 
climbed to 62% of the same indicator (18%), 
thus coming fairly close to the figure for the 
medium-sized countries. 
It might be said that the scanty industrial-
ization of the small countries at the start of the 
period under consideration made their indus-
trial path easier (in addition to the dynamic 
effect of the Central American Common 
Market during the 1960s), since it involved the 
development of manufacturing output in tradi-
tional activities and others of less complexity 
and smaller requirements with respect to 
markets, technology and capital. The medium-
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sized countries encountered harsher obstacles, 
since during this period they had to face the 
challenge of undertaking more advanced in-
dustrial activities, the difficulties in devel-
oping which were more easily overcome by 
countries with larger markets. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that when the 
overall industrial position reached by each 
country individually is considered, the general 
correlation between level of income and de-
gree of industrialization becomes somewhat 
blurred. Although the analysis is made in ap-
proximate terms, one notes that this is basically 
due to significant exceptions caused by ex-
tremely specific circumstances. For example, 
consideration of the countries at the highest 
regional level in terms of per capita product at 
the end of the past decade (around US$ 1 500 at 
1970 prices) reveals that Argentina required a 
high degree of industrialization (33%) to attain 
this, whereas Venezuela needed one of the 
lowest in Latin America (17%); this, however, 
is obviously and essentially due to the fact that 
it is an important petroleum-producing coun-
try. At the second-highest level (around US$ 
1 000), Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica 
needed to record an intermediate degree of 
industrialization (between 23% and 29%), 
whereas Panama needed only a fairly low 
degree (14%) due to its geographical situation 
and the Canal, which gives it a marked trend 
towards the services sector. At the lower levels, 
the most noteworthy atypical cases are Brazil 
(US$ 850) and Peru (US$ 600), in spite of their 
relatively high degrees of industrialization 
(30% and 25%, respectively). The explanation 
for this must be sought in the fact that they are 
among the countries with the most pronounced 
internal socio-economic inequities in the 
region, which implies that much of the popula-
tion is isolated from development and a great 
deal of employment is in activities with very 
low productivity, in contrast to the relatively 
high productivity of factory-type manufac-
turing, which operates mainly for the higher 
social strata. 
2. Structural change 
The value of using the degree of industrializa-
tion, defined simply as the weight of manufac-
turing activities in the economy, as an indicator 
of the industrial situation or trends is extremely 
limited. Consequently, other considerations of 
prime importance must enter into any analysis 
of the Latin American industrial model and the 
region's heterogeneity in this respect, or into 
any comparison with the industrial patterns of 
the mature economies. 
One of the most important aspects which 
helps, to define industrial progress is the 
productive structure, whose modifications as a 
result of development tend to follow the same 
pattern throughout the world. The most char-
acteristic and prevalent modification is the 
decreased weight of industries producing non-
durable consumer goods (slow-growing, tradi-
tional) and the extraordinary dynamism of the 
chemical and metal products and machinery 
industries principally producing intermediate 
goods, consumer durables and capital goods. 
This is what took place in the developed 
economies and also, of course, in the Latin 
American ones. In the former, the causes 
generally lie in technological progress and 
changes in the composition of demand tending 
towards greater sophistication. In Latin Amer-
ica, the phenomenon has been slightly differ-
ent, since in addition to the incorporation of 
technological progress and the behaviour of de-
mand, the policies designed to perfect the man-
ufacturing output structure have also been de-
cisive. One notes a decline in the weight of 
non-durable consumer goods industries in 
developed areas when the basic needs of the 
population have been largely met —needs 
which, among other goods and services, 
involve many items from the manufacturing 
group mentioned above. In Latin America, 
however, with few exceptions, the situation is 
different, causing an apparent paradox. 
A large portion of the population remains 
only partially or marginally involved in the 
consumption of manufactures, in accordance 
with the long-term trends and structural 
characteristics of Latin American develop-
ment, which are that most of the demand for 
manufactures comes from certain levels of 
society where basic needs are best met. Thus, 
the demand for non-durable consumer goods 
from traditional industries amounts to a sort of 
vegetative growth, so that it is the most modern 
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industries which contribute most to industrial 
dynamism. But this fact is also connected, as 
already noted, with technological progress, the 
transformation of the structure of demand, and 
the policy for the structural improvement of 
production, all within the framework of the 
social restrictions mentioned. Thus, the 
schemes for change in the industrial structure 
become coherent with the form or style fol-
lowed by Latin American development. Aníbal 
Pinto8 is referring to this when he notes that in 
Latin America such structural changes are con-
nected with the concentration of consumption, 
especially of durable goods, many of which are 
produced by the rapidly-expanding metal 
products and machinery industries, and ex-
plains that "the more dynamic elements of the 
productive apparatus are interrelated and 
depend mainly, and sometimes entirely, on the 
demand of the (social) groups situated at the 
peak of the distributive structure", adding that 
"given the (relatively low) level of average in-
come in the region and the countries, if the 
present style of development is to work and 
progress, then income and expenditure must 
be concentrated in those strata, so as to sustain 
and increase demand for the favoured goods 
and services". 
It has been pointed out that the structural 
changes in industry have taken place in Latin 
America along international lines and those of 
the developed economies. Between the mid-
1950s and the end of the 1970s, the weight of 
traditional industries dropped from 56% to 34% 
while that of the metal products and machinery 
industry climbed from 12% to 26%. Despite 
this very marked structural change, however, 
the situation is still far from equal to that of the 
mature economies where, again towards the 
end of the past decade, traditional industries 
represented around 20% or 25% of manufac-
turing output and metal products and machine-
ry, around 40% or 50%. 
The crux of the matter, of course, is that 
Latin American industry is in transition 
towards advanced stages; but there is also the 
fact that the technologically dependent style 
8 Aníbal Pinto, "Styles of development in Latin Ameri-
ca", CEPAL Review, first half of 1976. 
followed in the region implies lags in the 
output of products incorporating the techno-
logical innovations of the centres, especially in 
the intermediate and capital goods branches. 
This means that the capacity for dynamic 
growth is limited by imperfections in the chain 
of production, which of course are particularly 
reflected in foreign trade, especially in the 
heavy imports of intermediate and capital 
goods. 
The changes in the manufacturing struc-
ture have been noteworthy, however, go that 
industry today looks very different from that of 
30 years ago, progress having been made 
towards the development of extremely modern 
lines of production. At the same time, however, 
the difference in the situations of the countries 
has increased and is manifested in many 
aspects which go far beyond the enormous 
disparities in industrial size. Although in 
nearly all the countries of the region the struc-
tural changes were in the same direction, it was 
only in the large countries that the metal prod-
ucts and machinery industries acquired much 
weight (28%) and a major degree of national 
integration. In the medium-sized countries, 
this weight is low (17%), and in the small 
countries, it is practically insignificant (9%), 
conforming to the general lack of vertical inte-
gration in production processes, especially in 
the technologically most advanced branches. 
In the large countries, especially Argentina and 
Brazil, a large capital goods industry devel-
oped, and in the three biggest countries (Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Mexico) one finds nearly 
the entire spectrum of basic industries. The 
medium-sized countries have been able to 
produce few capital goods and have significant 
gaps in basic branches, while capital goods are 
hardly produced at all in the small countries, 
and basic industries are found only exception-
ally. 
In these respects, the size of the market has 
been decisive, as has often been the availabili-
ty of natural resources, in terms of advantages 
for basic development; to this we may add the 
fact that greater economic scale provides the 
essential amounts of capital and attracts the 
interest of transnational corporations, which 
have tended to settle most heavily in the spear-
head metal products and machinery industries. 
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It may be concluded, accordingly, that the 
industrial profiles of the various types of coun-
tries are only partially shaped by the fact that 
they are at different stages of industrial devel-
opment, since they have generated dissimilar 
models according to the greater or lesser 
severity of their local restrictions. We know 
that attempts have been made to overcome 
these restrictions through integration agree-
ments which, inter alia involve more intensive 
intra-sectoral specialization the smaller the 
country, but which simultaneously include the 
idea of advanced industrial development for all 
the members. 
3. External relations 
For historical and geographical reasons (with 
the exception of Cuba in the past two decades), 
ties with the developed Western market econ-
omies, which can be defined at the cultural, 
political, economic, financial, commercial, 
entrepreneurial, scientific and technological 
levels, have predominated in Latin America's 
external links. These long-standing and incon-
trovertibly strong ties, supported by the politi-
cal patterns prevailing within the region, have 
obviously had a decisive influence on the Latin 
American development style, and consequent-
ly on its forms of industrialization. 
In analysing this vertical connexion, the 
concept of interdependence is usually ques-
tioned, and Latin America's form of insertion in 
the West is often defined as a relationship of 
dependency: a concept which Raúl Prebisch9 
expands when he characterizes peripheral 
development as "a process of irradiation from 
the centres of techniques, consumption pat-
terns and other cultural manifestations, ideas, 
ideologies and institutions". 
In this context, the influence of North 
America and Western Europe upon most Latin 
American countries is quite invincible and 
operates in varying ways with respect to indus-
try, among which are especially salient the imi-
tative forms of consumption, especially on the 
part of the middle- and high-income strata of 
Latin American societies; the provision of man-
ufactures, which mainly come from those de-
aRaúl Prebisch, "Towards a theory of change", in 
CEPAL Review, No. 10, April 1980. 
veloped Western economies; the protection-
ism of the centres against manufactured exports 
from the region; the growing presence of trans-
national corporations in local manufacturing 
activities; and technological patterns relating 
to product characteristics and production pro-
cesses which are also incorporated predom-
inantly from these centres. 
There is no doubt that in certain respects 
these forms of external connexion have been 
changing, and that sometimes they become 
indirect with respect to Western centres. This 
is the case of the increased ties with Japan, for 
example, when the latter emerged as an indus-
trial power and competitor in the markets of the 
centres themselves and penetrated those of 
Latin America on the basis, inter alia, of inten-
sive technological development, while its large 
corporations entered the world of the transna-
t ional and set up branches in developing 
countries. It must be kept in mind, however, 
that Japan is located within the system of the 
developed market economies and that the 
sources of its advanced technological devel-
opment reach back to the West. It is also true 
that intra-regional ties in Latin America have 
expanded, but 90% of its manufactured imports 
still come from the developed market econ-
omies, while a significant portion of the 
growing intra-Latin American trade in manu-
factures is carried out by foreign transnational 
corporations, to say nothing of their techno-
logical intermediation role: a fact which is also 
often related to technical co-operation among 
countries of the region or the regional transna-
tionalization of local national and foreign 
corporations. This intermediary position is, 
above all, inherent in the semi-industrialized 
Latin American countries, as it is in some Asian 
countries which have achieved the same 
standing. It may be stated therefore that the 
essential characteristics of Latin America's 
external ties persist, as do the substantive 
aspects of their influence on the course of 
regional industrialization. 
At all events, the manners in which the 
centres exert their influence with respect to 
consumption, the supply of manufactures, 
transnational corporations and technological 
patterns are strongly interrelated and in some 
way depend upon each other. This is why the 
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process of Latin American industrialization has 
been characterized by rapid advances in the 
horizontal diversification of manufacturing 
output, especially of consumer goods, and 
insufficient progress in vertical diversification, 
a scheme which is usually called disparate in-
dustrial growth and which has entailed a rapid 
increase in the need for imports of intermediate 
and capital goods with the technology of the 
centres, in addition to a significant and growing 
negative balance between exports and imports 
of manufactures, in most cases not offset by 
external sales of primary products. Conse-
quently, an asymmetric trade scheme is pre-
served within a framework of intersectoral spe-
cialization. From a broad point of view one 
notes that this situation is tending to change, 
bu t the process is slow and the protectionism of 
the centres does not help in it. Thus, Latin 
America remains one of the regions most 'open' 
to manufactured imports and most 'closed' as 
regards the corresponding exports. This basic 
fact persists in the long term, and in general 
affects all the countries of the region, even the 
most industrialized, although the larger ones 
have made more progress in securing greater 
national integration in many industries and in 
producing capital goods, and thus import rela-
tively fewer manufactured goods. 
If this is the case, and the respective imbal-
ances arise at differing levels depending on the 
country or at different industrial stages in time, 
the reason must lie much deeper than a coun-
try's simple position within successive transi-
tional situations or its deliberate exercise of 
specific production policies which lead to this 
scheme. The underlying explanations must be 
sought, for example, in the virtually unrestric-
ted technological dependence and in the rapid 
innovations taking place in the centres, along 
with the socio-political importance of incorpo-
rating them into consumption and production, 
which is linked with the forms of capitalist ac-
cumulation that are transplanted into the 
region; all of this conforms to the predomi-
nance of political positions whose proponents 
are reluctant to correct the unjust distribution 
of income, but responsive to the urgent desire 
of the middle and upper classes to profit from 
the consumption patterns of advanced societies 
with high average income levels, a situation 
which makes them inclined towards depen-
dency and is hardly favourable to the indige-
nous and collective efforts which have largely 
characterized the industrialization of the de-
veloped economies. This could explain, inter 
alia, at least in part, the limited success of Latin 
American scientific and technological policies, 
which for the past two decades the countries 
have sought to organize in institutional terms, 
as well as the weakness or crisis in the integra-
tion processes in connexion with which the 
political, social and economic heterogeneity of 
the countries, as well as the conflicts and dis-
agreements between some of them and the po-
litical idiosyncracies which make them reluc-
tant to cede national sovereignty, must also be 
considered. 
With respect to production, the internal-
ization of technological progress occurs grad-
ually, following a process which often begins 
with imports of intermediate goods, compo-
nents and equipment, and may eventually 
penetrate at various levels, especially in the 
countries with the largest markets; but some-
times, simultaneously or later, other innova-
tions appear in the same or other branches, so 
that the basic situation persists, although at 
higher levels. 
The dynamism of production frequently 
appears to be stimulated more by competition 
to create demand (publicity, financing) or new 
or apparently new products than by competi-
tion in costs and prices, and transnational 
corporations with high import coefficients and 
low export coefficients are often guilty of this, 
despite some perceptible and often noteworthy 
progress. In most cases, this dynamism is 
complemented by a sort of association between 
the State as the supporter of the development 
style and the corporations, which in turn be-
come part of an oligopolistic network of nation-
al and international groups or corporations 
involved in other activities, including the fi-
nancial apparatus. In this way, a system is 
shaped which helps the firm establishment of 
what Cardoso and Faletto call "industrial 
economies in dependent societies"10 within 
i°F.H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependencia y 
desarrollo en America Latina, Mexico City, Siglo XXI 
Editores, 1977. 
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the framework of political alliances inclined 
towards dependency. 
The notion of the dependent society may 
be extended to other factors intimately con-
nected with the history of Latin American 
manufacturing development and which, to-
gether with the foreign trade problems, explain 
why the Latin American industrial debate is 
being increasingly directed at the considera-
tion of foreign relations and international co-
operation, especially 'vertical' co-operation 
from the centres (financing, technology trans-
fers, codes of conduct for transnational corpora-
tions, access to markets, etc.), and less so 
towards domestic efforts, although it must be 
acknowledged that the world economy has 
been moving towards growing interdependen-
cy and internationalization. 
This can be explained by the fact that some 
of the principal industrial stimuli have origi-
nated abroad, and are among the most out-
standing historical landmarks of Latin Ameri-
can industrialization; (a) the first and most 
noteworthy corresponds, as is repeated in all 
industrial analyses, to the 1930 crisis which in 
many countries ofthe region generated signifi-
cant industrial stimuli aimed at objectives such 
as domestic supply, which were later com-
bined with those occasioned by the Second 
World War; (b) secondly, there was a tendency 
towards the general spread throughout the 
region —especially in the 1950s, when un-
favourable external conditions had to be faced 
after the Korean War— of industrialization 
strategies which, even in the large and some 
medium-sized countries, legitimized the 
State's entrepreneurial activities in basic 
branches, which took place earlier in some but 
in other was postponed until recent times; (c) 
next, integrationist movements emerged 
whose ideological bases included the goal of 
giving bigger scale and competitiveness to 
industry in order to proceed to more advanced 
positions; (d) later, and especially from the 
1960s onwards, one notes the growing pres-
ence of transnational corporations which, in 
oligopolistic spheres, assumed the leadership 
in various manufacturing branches (especially 
the 'spearhead' branches, which were the 
most dynamic and had the greatest technolog-
ical content), penetrating the Latin American 
industrialization style or model without 
changing its essence; (e) almost simultaneous-
ly, after 1963-1964, there was rapid growth of 
manufactured exports, supported by the pre-
vious industrialization process, integration 
agreements, promotion policies, the general 
rise in the prices of industrial products in inter-
national trade and the world economic boom; 
(f) finally, there was the impact ofthe increase 
in petroleum prices and ofthe crisis which hit 
the developed market economies after 1973-
1974: an impact which, as stated earlier, was 
softened by the industrial capacity generated 
over past decades, aided by the greater facili-
ties in respect of external indebtedness, all of 
which contributed to the fact that industrial 
imports continued to grow, and even grew at 
higher rates, although the respective exports 
sharply decreased their growth rates. 
All of these landmarks, and perhaps others 
not included in this brief summary, are of real 
importance and helped to form what is today 
the industrial sector ofthe region. Predominant 
among them are the effects of external circum-
stances, either direct or indirect; however, it 
must be kept in mind that the legitimization 
and intellectual and political maturation ofthe 
industrialization strategy made a decisive con-
tribution in this regard. The fact that the 
region's industrial outlook is currently very dif-
ferent from that of thirty years ago, however, 
does not mean that the important factors men-
tioned above have helped to transform the 
basic tendencies ofthe Latin American model. 
Moreover, it must be stressed that the relevant 
impacts had varying implications, depending 
on the countries concerned, as regards indus-
trial dynamism, manufacturing structure and 
other aspects, among which we now wish to 
highlight foreign trade in manufactured goods. 
4. Foreign trade in manufactures 
The dissimilarity ofthe countries (natural re-
sources, geographical position, markets, etc.), 
and consequently of their industrialization 
models, as well as, sometimes, the various 
stages they are at, are clearly reflected in the 
various patterns of foreign trade in manufac-
tures, taking account ofthe relevant policies. 
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Thus, the more advanced stage of indus-
trialization of the three large countries, which 
are usually classed among the semi-industrial-
ized peripheral countries, is reflected in the 
fact that on the whole they have a larger and 
growing proportion of manufactures in the 
value of merchandise exports. Towards the end 
of"the 1970s, this proportion amounted to 33%, 
whi le for the medium-sized countries it was 
barely 8%, or 17% if Venezuela is excluded. 
Among the small countries, those of the CACM 
are worthy of note, for their external sales of 
industrial products taken altogether equalled 
around 30% of total merchandise exports until 
around 1970, when reciprocal trade began to 
weaken as a result of the well-known problems 
among the countries, the Common Market 
entered a stage of crisis and the economic dy-
namism of the group declined. Finally, for the 
other small countries, the figure in question did 
not exceed 11%. 
But industrial progress is perhaps most 
clearly reflected in the structure of manufac-
tured exports, since differing primary export 
facilities affect the above-mentioned figures, as 
in the obvious case of Venezuelan oil. Natural-
ly, the most outstanding is the weight of metal 
products and machinery, which exceeds 35% 
for the three large countries together, whereas 
it came to barely 14% in the medium-sized 
countries,. 11% in the CACM countries (thanks 
to reciprocal trade), and less than 1% in the 
other small countries. The figures thus high-
light a clear correlation with the relevant in-
dustrial structures, which are most advanced in 
the large countries, although not even the latter 
attained the manufactured export composition 
of the mature economies, where the relative 
weight of metal products and machinery is over 
50% or 60% of total external sales of industrial 
products. 
This fact is obvious, since if the metal 
products and machinery industry does not 
develop, then products from this branch can 
hardly be exported, and trade in these products 
is sharply influenced by the technological 
progress they incorporate, which is generated 
fundamentally in the mature economies. But 
stressing the associatiort between the produc-
tion structure and the pattern of manufactured 
exports is not a trivial matter, since the greatest 
dynamism in international trade is in the metal 
products and machinery branch, a fact which 
helps explain why the large Latin American 
countries increased their weight in the manu-
factured exports of the region from 58% in 1965 
to 70% in 1977, and to over 90% of all Latin 
American exports of metal products, machine-
ry, and transport, professional and scientific 
equipment . 
The situation is different in so far as 
imports of manufactures are concerned, since 
in all of the groups of countries their weight in 
total merchandise is around 70% or more, in 
some cases coming close to 80% (medium-
sized countries, CACM), which corresponds to 
the well-known foreign trade imbalance. 
With regard to the structure of industrial 
imports the problem is also different, since in 
all the groups of countries the metal products 
and machinery branch is prominently repre-
sented (over 40%, and even up to nearly 60%), 
largely as a result of the need to acquire 
components and capital goods (and, frequently, 
more advanced consumer goods), and it is here 
that the gaps in the production structure are 
most noticeable. 
Since the large countries have achieved a 
more advanced production structure, however, 
they import relatively fewer manufactured 
goods, for although they possess nearly 80% of 
the industry, they make only a little over 50% of 
the region's external purchases of industrial 
goods, and there is a similar figure for imports 
of metal products and machinery, although 
they possess nearly 90% of the industry in 
question. In all the other groups of countries, 
their proportion of regional imports of manu-
factures is significantly higher than that of their 
production, that is to say, these countries are 
more 'open', primarily because of the dif-
ferent stages they have reached or the differing 
industrial model rather than their having de-
veloped 'open' economic positions, keeping 
in mind the intensive trade within the Central 
American Common Market. 
The various models and degrees of indus-
trial progress are not only reflected in manu-
factured exports and imports, as described, but 
also affect the orientation of exports, although 
they influence less the source of imports, 
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wherein those from developed market econ-
omies, which consistently total around 90% for 
the region as a whole, nearly always predom-
inate. 
The three largest countries, all of which 
have more diversified production structures 
and manufactured exports, have most ex-
panded their markets throughout the world, 
despite the relative concentration of Argentina 
on LAFTA, Brazil on LAFTA, the United 
States and the European Economic Communi-
ty, and Mexico on LAFTA and especially the 
United States. At the same time, however, 
these countries have significant industrial ex-
ports to the socialist countries and to Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa, especially in the case 
of Argentina and Brazil, since Mexico, being 
further behind in the metal products and ma-
chinery industries, functions less as a techno-
logically intermediate producer and directs its 
industrial exports principally to the United 
States and the other countries with developed 
market economies, often within intra-indus-
trial and intra-company trading setups. The 
medium-sized countries concentrate these ex-
ternal sales primarily on less complex products 
and on the markets of the region, and penetrate 
the markets of the developed market econ-
omies through more specialized patterns, en-
tering other markets only exceptionally. Na-
turally, the Central American Common Market 
countries concentrate on traditional products 
and especially on reciprocal trade. The other 
small countries export few manufactured 
goods, nearly always simple ones from highly 
specialized categories on the basis of their nat-
ural advantages, especially when aiming them 
towards extra-regional markets. 
Intra-regional trade in manufactures is 
significant, but only in so far as exports are 
concerned, the latter representing 44% thereof 
around 1965, and later dropping to around 
40%. The corresponding imports, however, 
represent less than 9%. This situation undoubt-
edly reflects their big demand for technolog-
ically more advanced manufactures (manufac-
tured imports from the centres total around 
90%, and even more if imports from the social-
ist countries are included) and the fact that 
regional industry has not been able to make 
them available among the countries them-
selves, leaving aside the question of tech-
nological dependence, with respect to which 
the intermediation of the semi-industrialized 
countries is not adequate. The regional market 
has, nevertheless, provided these countries 
with a basis for moving into other markets, and 
transnational corporations have played a signif-
icant role in this. 
Regarding these corporations, it is im-
portant to stress that in general terms they show 
minimal interest in exporting but a great voca-
tion to import, largely on the basis of captive 
trade between main offices and branches and 
among branches located in the region, as Luiz 
Claudio Marinho states clearly in a recent 
study.11 It has been observed that in many 
countries the external operations of transna-
tional manufacturers, especially if financial 
movements are included, account for a con-
siderable portion of the balance-of-payments 
current account deficits of the countries in 
question. 
n Luiz Claudio Marinho, Las empresas1 transnaciona-
les y la modalidad actual de crecimiento económico de 
América Latina: algunas consideraciones (E/CEPAL/R. 
229, 19 June 1980). 
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III 
Discussion scenarios 
1. On the normative horizon 
(a) General characteristics of the 
eventual norm 
After the Second World War, major polit-
ical and economic projects were developed 
which supported the international boom that 
finally ran into crisis in 1973-1974. Industry, 
and even more so the international trade in 
manufactures, played a leading and dynamic 
role in that boom, especially among the devel-
oped market economies which, from 1955 to 
1973, increased their reciprocal trade in these 
products from 53% to 63% of the world total. 
The industrial growth of the developed 
economies (North America, Western Europe, 
the centrally planned European countries, 
Japan) was characterized by rapid technologi-
cal innovation in products and production 
methods and by the manufacture of goods for 
huge national and international markets in line 
with the widespread advance of social prog-
ress. Within the great overall system of the 
developed market economies, trade tended to 
be organized through regulations (GATT) and 
negotiated integration blocs (EEC, EFTA) in 
an atmosphere of progressive trade liberaliza-
tion and export-oriented policies. The socialist 
or centrally planned economies, which togeth-
er with Japan had the highest indexes of indus-
trial growth over the past three decades 
—10.2% and 12.7% per year, respectively, as 
compared with North America's 3.6% and 
Western Europe's 5.2% annually— also formed 
a group (CMEA) and developed a policy that 
was relatively closed to manufactured imports 
from outside the bloc. Japan, for its part, be-
came a spectacular exporter of industrial prod-
ucts of growing 'sophistication' and techno-
logical content, while simultaneously devel-
oping according to a policy that was extremely 
closed to imports of such products. 
The active world trade in manufactures was 
increasingly influenced by rapid innovations 
and the need for technological exchanges, as 
demonstrated by the fact that trade in products 
with the highest technological content, such as 
machinery and transport equipment, has been 
the most active. Among the developed Western 
market economies, this trade takes place very 
symmetrically according to intra-sectoral 
specialization patterns in which products of 
similar technological level are exchanged. The 
openness, although very limited, to manufac-
tured imports shown by the socialist economies 
and Japan largely corresponds to items where 
those countries have technological gaps. Fur-
thermore, the manufactured imports of the de-
veloping countries contain an increasingly 
heavy proportion of intermediate and capital 
goods which incorporate the technology 
created in the centres. 
Within this general situation North Amer-
ica, and the United States in particular, is in a 
separate sphere; with an income level three 
times as high as that of Western Europe in 1950 
but currently only twice as high, it is the largest 
single market in the world, the principal 
creator and provider of technology, and for 
some time its economic expansion has been 
sustained less by industrial growth, at least if 
the latter is measured conventionally, thus 
approaching what is usually called the post-
industrialization stage. 
Western Europe has long been a market 
with a high degree of industrial integration. In 
1955, as now, reciprocal manufactured imports 
represented 80% of the total from every part of 
the world and around 60% of manufactured 
exports corresponded to reciprocal trade. We 
also know that there is constant heightening of 
the trends towards the strengthening of inte-
gration processes and the intensification of 
scientific and technological research aimed, 
inter alia, at maintaining and enhancing 
competitive positions. 
The centrally planned economies, which 
have doubled their degree of industrialization 
and nearly quintupled their per capita product 
since 1950, did so by forming a political and 
economic bloc with a socialist pattern and a 
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significant degree of disconnexion from the 
rest of the world. Like the Western European 
economies, they are economies with a techno-
logical tradition, and the efforts they have made 
have been very notable. 
Japan, which nearly trebled its degree of 
industrialization and is close to having sep-
tupled its per capita product since 1950, also 
has traits which set it apart among the devel-
oped economies, such as its scarcity of natural 
resources: a situation which led it to indus-
trialize profoundly and make intensive efforts 
to adapt or develop adequate technology, until 
it managed to place itself in a spectacular 
export situation with manufactures of growing 
technological complexity. This country does 
not share the openness to manufactured im-
ports of the other developed market econ-
omies, especially in its trade with them, nor 
their industrial internationalization with 
respect to the penetration of foreign trans-
national corporations. Similarly, it is distin-
guished from such economies by the out-
standing role of the State which, although far 
from being on the socialist scale, followed 
somewhat similar lines due to the country's 
need to make deliberate efforts to achieve in-
dustrialization, 
Naturally, in the developed Western mar-
ket economies the State continues to play a role 
in industrial progress. Apart from the manipu-
lation of economic policy instruments often 
used for very specific industrial objectives, the 
State's decisive influence on research and de-
velopment stands out in the figures on public 
financing of such activities, which in countries 
like the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, 
Spain, the United States, Norway, the Nether-
lands, Great Britain and Sweden has recently 
amounted to 40% or 50% or more of total na-
tional expenditure in that category.12 In 
addition, the large State scientific and techno-
logical development projects (such as those on 
atomic energy, space travel and defence) 
clearly do much to disseminate technological 
progress. Furthermore, in the industry of 
countries such as those of the European 
i 2 U N E S C O , Science Policy Studies and Documents, 
No. 43, Paris, 1978. 
Economic Community one notes the signifi-
cant presence of the State as an entrepreneur, 
sometimes in connexion with nationalization 
action taken almost entirely without doctrinal 
causes but rather for specific economic and 
social purposes.13 
The developed economies have thus 
achieved industrial positions which with some 
exceptions have certain constant characteris-
tics, as noted in preceding paragraphs, which 
differ substantially from the Latin American 
characteristics mentioned above. 
In the oldest industrialized economies, 
these characteristics include an advanced de-
gree of complementarity in the production of 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods for 
large national or international markets, a fact 
which is reflected notably in the patterns of 
trade in industrial products. Firstly, there is the 
high proportion of manufactured exports; 
secondly, the preponderance of trade in those 
types of manufactures with the greatest techno-
logical content and degree of modernization, 
particularly in the metal products and machine-
ry branches; and finally, a position of net ex-
porter of manufactures (United States, EEC, 
Japan) or one near equilibrium (EFTA, central-
ly planned economies).14 Of course, all of this is 
combined with an industrial structure where-
in the relative weight of the metal products and 
machinery industries is increasing, to reach 
figures ranging from 36% (EFTA) to 49% (cen-
trally planned economies), while the weight of 
the non-durable consumer goods industries is 
decreasing to around 20% or 25% of the gross 
manufacturing product. As already noted, it is 
obvious that this process corresponds to the 
modifications in the demand structure where-
by, once basic needs are met, the population's 
demand is directed towards more 'sophis-
ticated' branches in line with the technological 
13A. Arancibia and W. Peres, "La polémica en torno a 
las empresas públicas en América Latina", in Economía de 
América Latina, September 1979, semester No. 3 (México 
City, CIDE) . Among other sources, the authors quote Coz-
zi, S. and Olmeda, G., "La presencia de la empresa pública 
en los países de la CEE" , in Cuadernos de Economía Polí-
tica, No. 8, Rome, January 1973, 
1 4United Nations, Yearbook of International Statis-
tics, 1978, Vol. 1, New York, 1979 (ST/ESA/STAT/SER. 
G/27). 
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progress in all economic activities and that 
which is incorporated into manufactures, all of 
which naturally has an effect on the chain of 
demand for consumer, intermediate and capital 
goods. 
It may be pointed out that among the es-
sential characteristics of the eventual norm is 
the high degree of self-sufficiency in the sup-
ply of manufactures in the large national mar-
kets or within economic blocs. Thus, it is to be 
noted that the developed capitalist economies 
as a whole do not open their industrial product 
markets greatly to the rest of the world; it is true 
that there has been a scarcity of suitable supply 
from the rest of the world, but it is equally true 
that there have also been protectionist ele-
ments at work15 which have tended to intensify 
recently, especially due to the trade imbalan-
ces caused by the rise in petroleum prices and 
the crisis which began in 1973-1974, with the 
accompanying recession, unemployment and 
inflation. 
The crisis has revealed some structural 
failings, among which are the loss of competi-
tiveness of some industries, especially light 
ones, compared with those on the periphery. 
Apart from the protectionist reaction of the 
centres (the developed market economies) and 
some opening of the socialist economies (above 
all for technological reasons), however, the 
most substantive revisions have not gone far 
beyond intellectual spheres, some concern on 
the part of employers, political discussions, and 
denunciations by the periphery in internation-
al forums, all this despite the serious trends 
which have already been developing and 
which may be foreseen for the future with 
respect to the restructuring of the world econ-
omy and the internationalization of capital and 
production. 
(b) Positions in Latin America 
As all the analyses show, in essence the 
Latin American industrial strategy has fol-
lowed a course from easy to more complex in-
dustries, basically oriented toward domestic 
15The background of UNCTAD I and the generalized 
systems of preferences illustrate this persistent protection-
ism. 
markets. The explicit or implicit central idea 
has been to emulate that which it seemed 
would eventually become the industrial norm, 
that is to say, the pattern of the developed econ-
omies. It is obvious, however, that Latin Amer-
ican industry is a long way from having the 
characteristics of the same sector in the mature 
economies, even if the most highly industrial-
ized countries in the region are taken into ac-
count, and an even more important point to 
make is that the trends do not indicate that the 
region can come really close to this model, at 
least in the near future. 
These trends are compounded by the fact 
that, partly because of the persistence of sig-
nificant economic (such as external imbalance) 
and social (such as marginality and poverty) 
problems, as well as dissatisfaction regarding 
the rates of economic expansion, opinions are 
forming which deliberately abandon the indus-
trial norm to which in any case, the Latin 
American industrialization process has not 
adhered in fundamental respects such as 
scientific and technological development and 
availability of large markets. It should also be 
repeated that industry does not have much 
autonomy with respect to the general economic 
and political determinants, so that consequent-
ly it cannot be saddled with responsibility for 
the most serious development problems of the 
region, especially when one realizes that it 
represents just over one-fourth of the Latin 
American economy and that less than one-fifth 
of the economically active population is em: 
ployed in manufacturing. 
Although to some extent the norm is being 
revised in the central countries themselves, 
and radical changes may be expected in the 
world economic order, the heart of the matter 
seems to lie rather, in the case of Latin America, 
in a certain underlying scepticism regarding 
the viability of implementing advanced indus-
trial patterns, while there are also arguments 
holding that other industrial paths will give 
better support to general development or 
questioning the validity of the norm for the 
specific case of the region and the heteroge-
neous countries making it up. 
Factors behind this scepticism include the 
large and in some respects growing gaps 
separating the region from the developed 
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economies, as well as the nature and mag-
nitude of the political efforts and commitments 
which will be necessary to bring industry 
closer to this normative model. Thus, it may be 
said that this immanent scepticism is mani-
fested in matters such as the region's great 
relative backwardness in scientific and techno-
logical development, which is expected to in-
crease in the future and which leads many to 
sustain the thesis that unbounded dependence 
is inevitable or that it would be advantageous to 
acquire all of the technology without needing 
to use huge resources on research and devel-
opment —a prospect which would be some-
what like following a mirage in view of the 
greater importance of establishing dynamic 
forms of accumulation and/or giving priority to 
urgent social objectives. 
At all events, the discussion of the norm's 
suitability is somewhat ambiguous, and it is 
frequently difficult to strip it of the halo of 
scepticism mentioned above. Two positions 
may be noted, however, which are fairly well 
defined when expressed in simplified terms. 
One is the position taken by those who 
somehow find in the norm the paradigm of 
industrialization and are concerned basically 
about the proper directions to take and the right 
instruments or mechanisms to use. The other 
position, with its different variations consid-
ered below in connexion with the relevant 
situations, rejects or indefinitely postpones the 
norm and attempts to formulate other options 
and suggest ways of implementing them. 
The first position holds the norm to be suit-
able but recognizes the heterogeneity of the 
countries in the region and the uselessness of 
applying the norm to isolated countries; it then 
takes the European experience and stresses 
collective efforts in conformity with the ide-
ological bases underlying the Latin American 
integration agreements (LAFTA, the Andean 
Group, the Central American Common Mar-
ket). Its basic arguments revolve around the 
dynamic capacity of the industrial structure 
derived from linking the production of con-
sumer goods with that of intermediate and cap-
ital goods; the inability of primary exports to 
support the incorporation of foreign technolog-
ical progress to benefit the entire society; and, 
consequently, the need to participate in the 
most active currents of international trade on 
the basis of intensive reciprocal intra-regional 
trade, serious efforts to achieve complementary 
scientific and technological development, and 
a certain degree of selective disconnexion from 
the rest of the world, at least until more solid 
industrial positions are reached. 
There are many variants based on this posi-
tion, mainly distinguished by the directions 
proposed, which as may be gathered from most 
of the official statements made during the past 
decade,16 are usually connected with priority 
social goals, the variants themselves being the 
subject of specific policies to which industry 
would adapt itself. 
One of these variants is the industrial-
ization pattern which has predominated up to 
now in Latin America but which, some say, will 
soon reach the end of its role as a preparatory 
phase for more advanced stages. This line of 
thought puts forward proposals regarding the 
possibility of deliberately, through specific 
policies, correcting trends and especially gaps, 
for example by means of a strategy designed to 
accelerate the production of intermediate and 
capital goods, generally in conjunction with 
policies for the export of industrial products 
within intra-sectoral specialization schemes 
and sometimes within the framework of inter-
national integration agreements in order to 
secure markets of the appropriate scale. 
Of course, it is not a question of black or 
white in these matters, since different positions 
frequently meet in common areas, or the differ-
ences between them are subtle and hardly dis-
tinguishable, although sometimes these sub-
tleties mask elements of enormous importance. 
Thus, the variants proposed as part of the cur-
rents of opinion which back up the norm tend 
to merge and become confused with the pre-
vailing trends or the implicit strategies of Latin 
American industrial policy which define a spe-
cific model pattern or dynamism, raising it to a 
higher level without changing its basic nature. 
^Consideration of 26 general and industrial develop-
ment plans and programmes from 16 Latin American coun-
tries clearly demonstrates this. 
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2. On world economic restructuring 
T h e rejection of the norm, which is often even 
considered obsolete for Latin America now that 
inclinations towards a new international eco-
nomic structure are being shown, together with 
the dissatisfaction with prevailing trends, are 
leading to t h e expression of other positions 
more and more clearly. Nevertheless, the cru-
cial distinctions are difficult, and as already 
noted the various political commitments in-
herent in the different industrial options are 
frequently not expressed clearly. 
Positions inspired by the need to 
restructure the world economy are many, but 
they obviously share a common strategy aimed 
at the export of manufactures, with or without 
the development of domestic markets. These 
positions state that restructuring implies the 
redeployment of industry to benefit the pe-
riphery, which would offer advantages such as 
natural resources and abundance of labour. In 
this way, the structure of the international divi-
sion of labour would be transformed, and new 
forms of accumulation based on the above-
ment ioned advantages would be reinforced in 
accordance with trends toward the internation-
alization of capital and production. Thus, the 
technological, entrepreneurial and market fac-
tors would be contributed essentially by the 
centres, whose companies would locate in Lat-
in America industrial activities less markedly 
oriented towards domestic markets and more 
a imed at the world, and especially the markets 
of the centres themselves. 
O n e of the arguments in favour of these 
viewpoints is the technological backwardness 
of certain central country industries, especially 
light ones, which must at all costs maintain 
high salaries to meet social priorities, and 
have consequently lost their competitiveness 
against the periphery, as mentioned earlier. 
This fact had already somewhat affected the 
international division of labour during the 
world economic boom, especially benefitting 
the industries of semi-industrialized countries 
in Latin America and Asia. In the former, the 
phenomenon took place essentially on the 
basis of the already existing industrial nucleus, 
whi le in the latter it was related to policies 
des igned to establish industries decisively 
oriented towards exports; it was generally, in 
both cases, directly or indirectly thanks to the 
activities of transnational corporations. 
Naturally, the success of exports to the 
centres was much more important for the four 
Asian countries mainly involved: South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. In addi-
tion to their strategies directly aimed at exports, 
their lower wage levels and the activities of the 
transnationals, it must be noted that these 
countries had very poor natural resources and 
were politically in the front line, so that they 
were protected by the market economy powers. 
Moreover, the model which emerged in them 
was essentially assembly industry with a high 
degree of import and re-export, as on Mexico's 
northern border with the United States, where 
the assembly industry has acquired great im-
portance, although the employment it offers 
does not exceed 10% of the country's manufac-
turing employment, and the value added in the 
country is only around one-third of the value of 
the re-exports. 
Aside from Mexico, some activities of this 
type have been located in other countries of the 
region (especially in Central America), al-
though on a smaller scale, while in others, such 
as Panama, they are being planned. It is dif-
ficult to view the reproduction of the Asian 
model on a large scale and in a general manner 
as viable for the region, however, primarily 
because many countries have passed the levels 
of development and industrialization of the 
four Asian countries mentioned above and en-
tered much more advanced industrial stages, 
and also because generally Latin America has 
significant natural riches. 
Thus, although the Asian model inspires 
some strategies, generally of a conservative 
political stance, the global Latin American op-
tion within the framework of world economic 
restructuring is generally proposed in terms of 
more profound industrialization, within which 
sub-contracting (one of the forms of which-is 
the assembly industry) is not the most impor-
tant ingredient. Many analysts think that the 
existing Latin American industrial bases could 
give rise to development based on intra-indus-
trial trade and exports of manufactures with a 
high degree of national and/or regional or sub-
regional integration. 
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At all events, these positions frequently 
propose the idea of opening up and activating 
world trade so that it would give rise to a new 
form of the international division of labour and 
promote reciprocal stimuli between the cen-
tres and the periphery in order to achieve eco-
nomic activation and development. Ideas have 
also been proposed such as those involving 
industrial redeployment on the basis of the 
advantages of the periphery, especially those 
connected with natural resources and the new 
forms of accumulation offered by the low wage 
levels, together with the industrial restructur-
ing of the centres to concentrate on spearhead 
and highly technical industries.17 
These ideas clash with the protectionist 
position of the centres: a fact reflected not only 
in the respective policies, but also in the severe 
limitations formulated in the corresponding 
legal instruments within the United Nations. 
Moreover, it is by no means unlikely that the 
efforts being made to achieve technological 
1 7In the international sphere, the concept of industrial 
redeployment has been widely discussed as a result of the 
Second General Conference of the United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization (UNIDO), held in Lima in 
1975, at which resolutions later ratified by the United Na-
tions General Assembly were adopted. 
To begin with, the essence of redeployment lay in the 
loss of competitiveness by certain industries in the devel-
oped countries in the face of the periphery's 'advantages', 
principally in abundant and cheap labour, the availability 
of natural resources and energy, or an ecology which could 
withstand contaminating or 'dirty' industries. 
Currently, as can be inferred particularly from the posi-
tions of the developing countries, while some of these 
points are accepted or rejected, the concept of redeploy-
men t has been expanded on the basis of a spectrum of 
broader objectives conforming to the industrial aspirations 
of the periphery. Such positions appear principally in the 
resolutions of the Second Latin American Conference on 
Industrialization (Cali, Colombia, 1979), the proposals of 
the Group of 77 (Havana, 1979), and the Declaration and 
Plan of Action of the Third General Conference of UNIDO 
(New Delhi , 1980). 
There has been some industrial redeployment towards 
the periphery; the installation of industries for domestic 
supply and assembly industries for re-export, for example. 
T h e new idea was to accelerate redeployment, covering 
activities to meet domestic but especially external de-
mands from the centres or other expanding markets. Ever 
s ince these ideas appeared, however, they have stressed 
concerted redeployment, not necessarily within the frame-
work of general trade liberalization. This reflected the 
reluctance of the central countries and implicitly took 
account of the undesirability of unrestricted opening-up in 
favour of the periphery. 
progress will tend to weaken or invalidate 
some of the advantages of the periphery once 
investments start to be made by the centre; it 
is suspected, for example, that the industrial 
revolution implied in the generalized use of 
micro-processors could undermine the 'advan-
tages ' currently offered by low wages in labour-
intensive manufacturing activities. 
Nevertheless, Pedro Vuskovic1" notes that 
there are very noticeable trends towards indus-
trial redeployment from the developed capital-
ist economies to the periphery because of the 
large masses of cheap labour there, under the 
banner of the internationalization of capital 
and production and with the consequent de-
nationalization of the developing countries. In 
contrast to the technological progress which, 
through productivity increases, would tend to 
counteract the 'advantages' of low wages and 
lead to 'defensive' investment,19 Vuskovic 
mentions the fact that other advances help 
support the trend towards redeployment, such 
as those which facilitate the splitting-up of 
production processes and the separation of 
those stages requiring greater labour density 
or capable of being performed by less-skilled 
workers, the greater efficiency of transport, and 
the facilities brought to long-distance adminis-
tration by improved communications. Vuskovic 
explains that "because of this, the historical 
opportunity for autonomous industrial devel-
opment which would represent progress to-
wards new stages of development of the pro-
ductive forces and new and more progressive 
social objectives is not being opened up... (to 
the u n d e v e l o p e d areas)". 
It would appear that these .trends in the 
capitalist economy and their actual meaning for 
Latin American industry are in line with the 
dependen t industrial model which predomi-
nates in the region and which in some cases is 
even tending to be accentuated due to influ-
ences from abroad which penetrate society, the 
economy, industry and the markets and are not, 
l 8Pedro Vuskovic, "América Latina ante nuevos tér-
minos de la división internacional del trabajo", in Eco-
nomía de America Latina, March 1979, Semester No. 2, 
C I D E , Mexico City. 
^Jav ie r Villanueva, Perspectivas del desarrollo indus-
trial latinoamericano; una completa transformación, IDB/ 
INTAL, Basic Studies Series No. 3. 
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as in the mature economies grouped in various 
combinations, counterbalanced by outward in-
fluences. Thus, more intensive internation-
alization and interdependence would have a 
predominantly de-nationalizing effect on Latin 
America, where confidence in indigenous and 
collective industrial efforts within the region 
would decline even further, quite apart from 
the serious ethical dilemma which would be 
posed by using low wages to support the export 
of manufactures. 
It would seem that outstanding among 
these influences, which have been extensively 
analysed in Latin American economic and so-
cial literature and briefly recalled in other 
paragraphs of this document, are the trans-
national corporations, which have been assum-
ing the most dynamic role in the industry 
of many countries in the region due to their 
favoured location in spearhead areas or in 
others where, because of their characteristics, 
they take the lead in the activities involved. 
Such a propensity does exist, since it is a well-
known fact that, at least in relative terms, these 
corporations have been replacing local private 
corporations, which in many countries barely 
hang on as the predominant owners in tradi-
tional branches or backward industrial strata, 
while the public enterprises generally main-
tain their dominant role in the basic areas. 
In this way, the ultimate effects of world 
restructuring would once again be accom-
plished facts which Latin America would 
receive passively, and the markets of the cen-
tres would be added to the other elements of 
external influence. Again in the words of Carlos 
Matus,20 it would once more be a matter of a 
"dynamic conjuncture" and not of a "con-
structed policy" based on ideas which took 
account of the most important objectives of eco-
nomic and social development. 
3. On the International Development Strategy 
The principal objectives and mechanisms of 
industrial policy in Latin America have been 
discussed in connexion with the formulation by 
the United Nations of the International Devel-
opment Strategy for the 1980s. 
20Carlos Matus, op. cit. 
In these discussions, the first thing one 
notices is the nature of the proposals, which are 
highly industry-oriented, although within pat-
terns which safeguard other goals such as those 
connected with agriculture, nutrition and other 
social problems. These positions, which main-
tain or enhance the leading role of the manufac-
turing sector, are rooted in the Third World's 
general aspirations such as the "Lima objec-
tives"21 aimed at the achievement by the devel-
oping countries of 25% of the world's industrial 
output by the year 2000 (as against 9.1% in 
1978), or Latin America's ambition of attaining 
by the same year a share of 13.5% of world 
industry (4.9% in 1978).22 Thus, while signifi-
cantly faster economic growth objectives than 
those of past long-term trends are established 
for 1990 and 2000 and their implications are 
reviewed, industrialization processes are cal-
culated and considered which provide for even 
more rapid manufacturing growth rates. 
The fact that such aspects are mentioned in 
various quantitative scenarios is in line with 
the idea of analysing economic implications in 
the light of the social goals of development. 
They are thus illustrative exercises, although 
they generally correspond to Latin American 
aspirations, which include not only the accel-
eration of economic and industrial growth, but 
also the desire for this growth to take place 
more evenly throughout the countries and not 
in such a disparate manner as in past decades. 
The implications for industry are fairly se-
rious, since high growth rates require much 
more extensive development of manufacturing 
than in the past and make it necessary to meet 
needs such as those of exporting on a large scale 
to furnish the capacity required for importing 
as well as to permit the viable operation of 
branches that call for large markets. In short, 
what is involved is structural improvement, 
above all relating to the efficient production 
of intermediate and capital goods with higher 
technological content. 
This improvement, of course, involves 
the need to increase the dynamic capacity 
21Third General Conference of UNIDO, Lima, Peru, 
1975. 
22Latin American Conference on Industrialization, 
Mexico City, 1974. 
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stemming from technological relationships be-
tween final, intermediate and capital goods 
production inside and outside industry. It also 
involves, however, the need to participate in 
the most active international trade flows and to 
adapt supply to the requirements of the intra-
regional trade in manufactures, whose growth 
rate must be extremely rapid in view of the 
discouraging predictions regarding the de-
mand of the central countries, from which 
around 90% of the manufactures imported by 
the region currently come and in which prod-
ucts connected with this structural improve-
ment predominate. 
At this point it must be kept in mind that 
we are proceeding from the assumption that 
after several decades of manufacturing devel-
opment oriented towards domestic markets, the 
industrial stage reached by the region would 
allow many countries to expand the spectrum 
of their industrialization objectives. Thus, for 
example, in most countries exports of manufac-
tures are not viewed as an optional strategy but 
as a complementary element in a more ad-
vanced stage of industrialization. In general 
terms, the orientation of industrial output to-
wards the population's basic needs would like-
wise not constitute a separate strategy, since 
Latin American industry would be capable of 
meeting the demand arising from objectives 
and policies aimed at the full-scale incorpo-
ration of the population into the benefits of 
development. 
It should also be made clear that in the 
quantitative terms which are usually em-
ployed, the emphasis on exports of manufac-
tures does not imply an industrial model exces-
sively directed abroad. In the first place, we 
must recall that for ten years Latin American 
exports of manufactures grew at a rate of just 
over 20% annually (at constant 1970 prices) 
until the end of the world economic boom in 
1973-1974. The coefficient of manufactured 
exports, or their FOB value in comparison with 
the gross domestic industrial product, barely 
reached 8%, or approximately 4% if only the 
value added by these exports is counted. In 
other words, the experiment in rapid expansion 
of manufactured exports has already been car-
ried out with rates comparable to those which 
would be required in order to permit rapid 
rates of economic growth and, although they 
grew as a share of the product, they do not 
explain the industrial dynamism of the past. 
For the 1980s, it may easily be calculated that if 
industrial expansion were 8.5% per year and 
exports of manufactures grew 20% annually, by 
1990 the increase in industrial output due to 
these exports would only represent just over 
16% of total industrial expansion, and the ex-
port coefficient would climb only from 4% to 
11%. 
Thus, even taking account of the indirect, 
dynamic impact of external sales of manufac-
tures, the model will continue to be one of 
predominantly inward-oriented development. 
Domestic demand based on the general eco-
nomic dynamism and the removal of socio-eco-
nomic frontiers, together with structural im-
provement and its stimulating effects, will be 
elements of prime importance for industrial 
expansion. Since it is generally felt that 
the Latin American development style will 
continue to involve large imports of manufac-
tures —a scheme which cannot indefinitely be 
based on external indebtedness in view of the 
inability of primary exports to finance the nec-
essary import capacity— manufactures will be 
given an active role in exports, on the basis of 
the structural and technological improvement 
of regional industry. 
At this point we must ask what difference 
there would be for Latin America between the 
industrialization patterns proposed and the 
positions oriented towards the industrial mod-
el of the developed economies, since rapidly 
expanding exports of manufactures have impli-
cations which bring these patterns closer to the 
norm. Firstly, one must think, at least in the 
long term, of the most dynamic trade flows, i.e., 
exports of products such as chemicals and met-
al products and machinery. Secondly, in the 
light of the prospects of the centres, there is 
greater need to stress intra-regional trade, 
within systems of intra-sèctoral complementa-
tion and specialization, in line with the restric-
tions imposed by domestic markets and the 
heterogeneity of the countries. Apart from their 
effect on domestic dynamism, which is based 
on the linkages between the consumer, inter-
58 
mediate and capital goods production pro-
cesses, these considerations mean that there is 
an urgent need to orient the structure of region-
al industrial production towards that of the cen-
tres, modifying it only slightly in the light of the 
local availability of natural resources, envi-
ronmental and energy precautions or the most 
pressing social objectives. If this is not done, it 
would be easy to predict that the gaps which 
currently separate the region from those econ-
omies will tend to broaden, that the internal 
and external imbalances characteristic of Latin 
America will get worse, or simply that long-
term economic growth will be threatened. 
Thirdly, we must again stress what we have 
said regarding the scientific and technological 
development effort and the creation of com-
parative advantages in accordance with the 
dynamic conception of these. 
The similarities between the patterns cor-
responding to the ideas discussed in connexion 
with the International Strategy and positions 
oriented toward the norm are again to be noted 
w h e n the direction followed in successive tran-
sitional situations is observed. For example, 
in both cases an industrial and technological 
maturation process is involved until industry 
acquires an advanced capability to compete 
beyond simple technological intermediation 
with respect to the domestic and external mar-
kets. This is so because international trade in 
manufactures is increasingly motivated by the 
requirements of technological exchange: that 
is, the need for innovations incorporated into 
industrial products, either consumer, inter-
mediate or capital, quite apart from the influ-
ence of comparative advantages in their dy-
namic form, of course. Otherwise, industry 
could continue to grow without solving persis-
tent problem such as the uneven development 
and asymmetry of foreign trade, although these 
problems could move to higher levels, as in the 
case of a strong position with regard to exports 
of traditional manufactured goods with lower 
technological content and weaker elasticity of 
demand: a position which could be attained 
primarily by opening up the enormous markets 
of the developed economies. The concept of 
the path to be followed thus implies the idea of 
raising this level and using pragmatically all 
possible channels for industrial development 
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and export, as well as the industrial enrichment 
of primary products and the opportunities to 
be provided by redeployment within the con-
text of the New International Economic Order. 
At this point the ideas in question not only 
become akin to the position oriented towards 
the norm, they also overlap with the position 
involving international economic restruc-
turing, although they certainly go far beyond it 
in terms of explicit long-term objectives and the 
types of international agreements felt to ensure 
real benefits for the region. 
Perhaps the differences with the position 
oriented towards the norm are due mainly to 
the fact that the ideas in question are discussed 
within the context of the new International 
Development Strategy, which naturally stres-
ses world economic reordering and, conse-
quently, external connexions and international 
co-operation, especially that originating in the 
central economies. 
According to the ideas being considered, 
the region's domestic and collective efforts 
and horizontal co-operation at the Third World 
level would have to be very substantial and 
must seek not only to form a suitable industry 
with respect to the fundamental goals of eco-
nomic and social development, but also to face 
the international difficulties resulting from 
recessive trends in the world economy and the 
often negative position adopted by developed 
economies with regard to the problems of the 
periphery and the ways in which Latin America 
seeks to gain full entry to the world economy. 
Within the framework of such concepts, it 
would be extremely hard to attain ambitious 
economic and social objectives without the co-
operation of the developed economies. It must 
be kept in mind that this includes the idea of 
benefiting from, inter alia, the technological 
progress achieved by the centres; the entrepre-
neurial capacity which they have generated; 
international capital and financial aid; forms of 
accumulation offering advantages to the re-
gion; and the large markets of the developed 
economies. The possibilities for success would 
increase if all of these elements were com-
bined, and this would require of the central 
economies a flexible willingness to co-operate 
within the framework of the New International 
Economic Order and, with more specific re-
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gard to industry, in accordance with the Lima23 
and New Delhi24 Declarations and Plans of Ac-
tion, and at the regional level, with the state-
ments of the Latin American governments at 
the Cali meeting.25 
All of these instruments are in line with the 
trend whereby, as the world economy has kept 
on increasing the degree of internationalization 
and interdependence among countries and re-
gions (a development in which the periphery, 
and particularly Latin America, is involved), 
ideas and requests for co-operation have been 
proposed in increasingly integrated guise as 
regards their scope, forms and themes. Never-
theless, the appraisals made do not reveal 
results commensurate with the complexity of 
these sets of proposals, as may be seen from a 
declaration of the Group of 77,26 for example, or 
as emerges from the analyses made within the 
framework of the Latin American Economic 
System (SELA) regarding the lack of political 
will shown by the industrialized countries 
in the North-South dialogue, at UNCTAD V, 
UNIDO III, the Tokyo Round, and the Venice 
Summit.27 Governments, too, have stressed 
this, or left it to be inferred, in the regional 
appraisals of the International Development 
Strategy made in the 1970s in CEPAL. 
It is these factors and the uncertain world 
economic trends that give rise to the main un-
known quantities, one of which is the industrial 
significance which the new International De-
velopment Strategy for the 1980s could have for 
Latin America. Of course, there are also major 
uncertainties connected with the domestic pol-
icy of the countries in the region and the need 
to strengthen intra-regional ties. 
The topic of intra-regional ties merits spe-
cial attention, since it is felt that one of the most 
dynamic and fundamental pillars of develop-
ment is the rapid growth of reciprocal trade 
23Second General Conference of UNIDO, Lima, Peru, 
1975. 
24Third General Conference of UNIDO, New Delhi, 
1980. 
2 5 Second Latin American Conference on Industrial-
ization, Cali, Colombia, 1979. 
^ H a v a n a , December 1979. 
2 7Latin American Regional Co-ordination Meeting 
prior to the Eleventh Special Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, New York, August 1980. 
in manufactures among Latin American coun-
tries. Estimates for tbe year 2000 predict pro-
found changes in the region's foreign trade in 
industrial products, the most noteworthy as-
pect being that of manufactured imports, less 
than 9% of which currently come from intra-
regional trade whereas, as noted earlier, 90% 
come from the developed countries. This state 
of affairs would have to change sharply until 
intra-regional trade in manufactures greatly 
increased, possibly to around 50% of imports or 
70% (currently 40%) of exports. 
Obviously, these proposals have very se-
rious political, industrial and technological 
implications. Firstly, it must be borne in mind 
that this new structure of trade in manufactures 
would call for a high degree of regional co-
operation, and this in turn would require firm 
and far-reaching socio-political support forces. 
Secondly, the intensive growth of reciprocal 
trade would involve significant changes in the 
industrial structure that would allow supply to 
be adjusted, especially in branches which are 
currently backward in their development such 
as some chemicals, metal products and ma-
chinery and others, particularly intermediate 
and capital goods. The regional scale makes 
such adjustments possible within the frame-
work of rapid economic growth and also makes 
it easier to involve all the countries in various 
levels of specialization according to size of na-
tional markets and other factors, avoiding com-
mercial relations of the centre-periphery type 
which tend to develop between the more- and 
less-industrialized countries in the region. 
The most serious problem, however, is con-
nected with technological development and 
the autonomous efforts required for it, since 
limitless dependency and the desire rapidly to 
incorporate the innovations of the centre lead 
to permanent gaps which are usually filled 
through imports of manufactures, the produc-
tion of which is slow to get underway and often 
does so with a high imported content. 
For this reason, in some estimates for the 
year 2000 the Latin American industrial struc-
ture merely approaches that currently prevail-
ing in the mature economies, the metal prod-
ucts and machinery branch being placed rather 
below the average of the developed countries. 
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These estimates also take account of the orien-
tation which exists towards basic industries, in 
view of the availability of natural resources, 
and the stimulation of the market in numerous 
consumer goods branches which would be 
caused by policies designed to bring about the 
full-scale incorporation of the population into 
the benefits of development. In any event, the 
development of the metal products and ma-
chinery and other backward branches is essen-
tial in order to operate within the more flexible 
flows of international trade and to achieve a 
sharp increase in intra-regional trade. 
4. The trend towards openness 
For some time, the strategy of 'openness' has 
been implemented, is in course of imple-
mentation or is under discussion in some Latin 
American countries against a background of 
conservative political ideologies and within 
the framework of orthodox economic policies. 
Its theoretical foundation is essentially that the 
free play of market forces in national and inter-
national spheres will bring benefits, on the as-
sumption that these forces will lead to optimal 
resource allocation. At the international level it 
is assumed that competition will lead to an im-
proved use of comparative advantages and to 
the promotion of efforts designed to improve 
production efficiency, technological innova-
tion and competitive capacity. Conversely, it is 
assumed that selective and restrictive import 
strategies will inhibit exports, whereas the 
latter are essential for development, and that in 
general the expansion of international trade 
will once again constitute one of the funda-
mental bases for the revitalization of the world 
economy. 
In its simplest version, 'openness' —de-
fined as the removal of barriers against imports 
and based on the free play of market forces— 
has two basic implications: one involves the 
withdrawal of the State from production, plan-
ning and support or promotion activities, while 
the other implies the limitation of international 
trade regulations, including those affecting the 
activities of integration blocs. 
Thus, 'openness' means abandoning not 
only direct, but also indirect protectionist poli-
cies like those inherent in national policies or 
integration schemes designed to aid fledgling 
economic activities or to attain other objectives, 
such as some of a social nature (employment 
and rural development, for example) or those 
aimed at ensuring dynamic capacity and com-
petitiveness in the medium term. 
Clearly, as stated above, 'openness' in its 
purest sense involves no strategy regarding the 
production structure or, consequently, indus-
trial, scientific and technological development, 
all of which is left to the forces of the national 
and international markets and to the compara-
tive advantages which in industrially weak 
countries consist primarily of natural resources 
and/or low wages. Certainly, there is some 
connexion between this position and others in 
terms of the importance they attach to interna-
tional trade, but the options contained in the 
conventional norm, world economic restructur-
ing or the International Development Strategy 
stress trade in manufactures, whereas true 
'opennes' is not explicit on this point, al-
though it assumes that employers, stimulated 
by competition, would try to achieve efficiency 
in order to trade in international markets ori-
ented towards the world, without the red tape 
involved in association or integration accords 
or agreements between countries. 
Extreme 'openness' might possibly be 
considered as a special form of the positions 
connected with world economic restructuring: 
that is to say, a form from which all types of 
discriminatory domestic policies (industrial-
ization, generalized export of manufactures, 
subcontracting and assembly industries in free 
zones, etc.) or any other agreed schemes apart 
from that inherent in the liberalization of inter-
national trade are absent. It accepts that type of 
industrial redeployment which may be called 
spontaneous, but rejects that included in the 
ideas of the New International Economic 
Order which, as a means of supporting indus-
trialization in the periphery, has been pro-
posed in negotiated terms by UNIDO and the 
countries at its General Conferences and by the 
United Nations General Assembly, a fact which 
is well demonstrated by the establishment of 
the UNIDO system of consultations or the res-
ervations of the developed countries which 
include clauses tending to protect their inter-
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ests and security. Concrete political positions 
which conceive of or accept redeployment 
simply as a product of the liberalization of in-
ternational trade are rarely encountered, since 
declarations on the subject by some developed 
countries frequently consist of rhetoric de-
signed to placate the demands of the periphery 
for such items as access to their markets and 
technical, financial and entrepreneurial assis-
tance in order to carry out the redeployment. 
In general terms, the 'openness' in the re-
gion also corresponds to political views which 
give preference to national or foreign private 
enterprise and the free play of the market 
forces, even in a situation of oligopolistic struc-
tures and concentration of capital. Although the 
question of openness is topical in most coun-
tries of the region, in many of them it is ac-
companied by explicit, concrete policies for 
industrialization and the promotion of exports 
of manufactures along lines which in some 
cases were successful at a much earlier date. 
It is perhaps worth recalling that, in spite 
of protectionist régimes of weak or average in-
tensity, some middle-sized countries (such as 
Venezuela, because of petroleum) and many 
small ones (such as those of the CACM and 
especially Panama, inter alia) have always 
been very favourable towards manufactured 
imports, reflecting industrial results which dif-
fer from those of the large countries and primar-
ily due to the restrictions of the domestic mar-
ket, the availability of natural resources or their 
geographical positions (for example, the pres-
ence of the Canal gives Panama a natural ten-
dency towards services), rather than to dif-
fering aspirations. 
Certainly, Latin American analyses have 
long maintained that external competition is 
healthy within the prevailing economic and 
socio-political context, which is extremely 
demanding with respect to imports of manufac-
tures (especially intermediate and capital 
goods and also luxury consumer goods in the 
least-industrialized countries) and, conse-
quently, with respect to the exports which are 
needed to ensure the necessary import capac-
ity. This, among other things, was kept in mind 
when the ideological bases for the integration 
agreements were established according to 
which the expanded markets would provide 
support (scale, efficiency, specialization, com-
mercial experience, etc.) for the access of their 
manufactures to international markets in gen-
eral. To some extent this has happened, most 
notably with metal products and machinery of 
high technological context, although it has 
mainly taken place in the largest countries. 
The current trend towards openness in 
Latin America obviously follows the import-
export model, but avoids integration i st posi-
tions and is directly oriented towards the 
world. It is precisely for this reason that in the 
industrialization debate it is interesting to note 
that conceptually speaking this trend fits 
in with what Fernando Fajnzylber calls the 
"global restructuring project"28 with respect to 
world capitalism: a project aimed at liberal-
izing the market, which has been taking intel-
lectual shape in some financial, entrepre-
neurial, academic and political circles. As far as 
the developing countries are concerned, these 
concepts hold that "ideal projects would be 
those which make world economic expansion 
functional by facilitating imports, eliminating 
export subsidies, promoting and creating fa-
vourable conditions for foreign investment, 
weakening the regulatory action of the public 
sector, freezing wage pressures and ques-
tioning regional co-operation schemes". On 
this matter, in addition to other comments, 
Fajnzylber states that "given the political and 
social situation of the developed world, it is 
hardly likely that the 'global restructuring' 
project will be fully implemented...", and that 
with respect to industrial exports, "the Latin 
American countries must simultaneously face 
the promotion of exports from developed coun-
tries, growing protectionist barriers in the de-
veloped countries, pressure to diminish their 
own protectionism [that of the developing 
countries], and trends promoting the provision 
of greater facilities for direct investment in the 
countries". He adds that it is paradoxical that it 
should be "in this context that the most forceful 
criticism is made of Latin American industrial-
2SFernando Fajnzylber, "Sobre la reestructuración del 
capitalismo y sus repercusiones en la América Latina", in 
El Trimestre Económico, Mexico City, October-December 
1979, No. 184. 
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ization, calling for the elimination of protec-
tionism and the reduction to a minimum of'in-
terference' associated with public action". 
At least for the foreseeable.future, then, 
Latin American 'openness' must be unilateral, 
because the region forms part of an inter-
national economy which has no intention of 
freeing the market forces, and even if this were 
done by governments, the growing industrial 
domination of the great transnational corpora-
tions which tend to control trade and manage 
the market for manufactured products, espe-
cially those in which international trade is most 
vigorous, would still'remain. 
Within the region itself, the trends towards 
openness which are expressed in significant 
realities are few, so that within the Latin Amer-
ican framework as well they are in practice 
unilateral and, naturally, have not been 
concerted. 
Moreover, the few Latin American exper-
iments are as yet extremely short, and none has 
reached the purest and most extreme version of 
'openness', even that of Chile, which is the 
most advanced. The only one which goes back 
any length of time is the Panamanian experi-
ment, but this has very special characteristics 
since Panama is one of the Latin American 
countries of most recent industrialization and 
its manufactured exports are insignificant. 
Furthermore, it would seem that openness 
helps to heighten some of the basic traits of the 
context of Latin American industrialization and 
its patterns. Consumption, of course, is imita-
tive and advanced in comparison with average 
income, and there is a strong tendency to im-
port manufactures within asymmetrical exter-
nal trade patterns, since the main easy com-
parative advantages lie in the abundant natural 
resources, which lead to the export of raw mate-
rials and foodstuffs with little or no processing, 
or at best to the export of semi-manufactured 
goods, among which most of the so-called 
'non-traditional' exports should be classified. 
To this must be added the structural weakness 
with respect to inter-indus trial relations, tech-
nological dependency, trans national ization, 
external indebtedness, and de-nationalization 
in general. 
One may easily observe that openness has 
different meanings in countries with differing 
industrial characteristics and situations. Aldo 
Ferrer,29 for example, in analysing the orthodox 
economic policies implemented in Argentina 
and Chile, explained how they have had dif-
fering effects in those countries on "the process 
of readjusting the production structure and 
dismantling industry" and points out that the 
"dynamic effect of export activities based on 
comparative static advantages" is also very 
diferent. He views economic size and degree of 
industrial advancement as especially impor-
tant, and concludes that, given the larger 
domestic market and much more advanced and 
integrated industrial position of Argentina, in 
that country "the dismantling of the industrial 
base ... is a more difficult undertaking... than in 
Chile". He submits that "in a smaller economy, 
the dismantling of industry ... may be compen-
sated by the expansion of exports based on ... 
natural resources", but that "in an economy the 
size of that of Argentina, this is practically im-
possible", so that "in the Argentinian case, the 
orthodox strategy inevitably implies a drop in 
the growth potential of the economic system". 
One must ask, however, if in smaller econ-
omies the compensation referred to can last 
over the long term, 
5. Inward-oriented strategies 
So far we have commented on four schemes or 
scenarios which in one way or another involve 
relatively different industrial strategies: the 
position oriented towards the model of the 
advanced countries, world economic restruc-
turing, ideas in line with the new International 
Development Strategy, and the trend towards 
openness. As we have noted, however, these 
schemes overlap, so that it is often not easy to 
distinguish them clearly, with the sole excep-
tion, perhaps, of the trend towards indiscrimi-
nate openness. It is also often difficult properly 
to assess the differences in industrial projec-
tions implied in these schemes, especially 
when they are considered according to the 
concept of the path to be followed towards 
more advanced positions. 
29Aldo Ferrer, "El monetarismo en la Argentina y 
Chile", in Ámbito Financiero, Buenos Aires, 22 August 
1980. 
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Nevertheless, and although the distinction 
between the four schemes is somewhat ambig-
uous, the discussion is useful and revealing 
with regard to some of the most important in-
dustrial implications, as explained earlier. 
Thus, the position oriented towards the con-
ventional norm is extremely clear in its formu-
lations, since the path it prescribes is based on 
the industrial model and the economic and 
integration ist machinery of the developed 
economies and it assigns an important role to 
complementary technological development, 
which is not the case with the scheme cor-
responding to world economic restructuring 
and much less so with that aimed at openness. 
Only the new International Development 
Strategy takes a position which is more favour-
able towards the norm, from which it draws 
extremely important elements, while however 
greatly stressing extensive external connexions 
and integral international co-operation with 
emphasis on the responsibilities of the devel-
oped market economies and on intra-regional 
links. 
It should be stressed that one of the com-
mon points or areas where these schemes, and 
their respective industrial projections, coin-
cide is that of the importance attached to ex-
ternal relations, although they often differ 
fundamentally with regard to the accent or 
direction thereof. It is here that some of the 
most obvious differences with the inward-
oriented strategies of the region and the coun-
tries may be seen. In these strategies, priority is 
given to industrialization linked with the pri-
mary sectors, especially agriculture; to solving 
social problems and providing employment; 
and to meeting the population's basic needs 
according to partially indigenous technological 
patterns with consumption schemes suited to 
the level of development and frequently in line 
with deliberate distribution policies. Conse-
quently, it is in connexion with these objec-
tives that the inward-oriented strategies pro-
pose the need to build an industrial model 
wherein final, intermediate and capital goods 
production are properly included. These strat-
egies also specify an important role for the 
Strate, often even assigning it entrepreneurial 
production activities. 
In general, these strategies are based on 
the different role which industry must play 
with respect to development in the Third 
World in comparison with the developed econ-
omies. Thus, industry is often seen as a stimu-
lus for agriculture and other primary sectors, 
perhaps as a first step towards more advanced 
stages in the future. In accordance with this 
concept, traditional means of measuring the 
degree of industrialization of developing 
countries are usually considered to be useless; 
rather, it should be evaluated by the degree to 
which natural resources are processed in in-
dustry. 
Moreover, the various versions do not nec-
essarily propose delinking from the exterior, 
since they are often proposed in connexion 
with ad hoc means of international integration; 
however, they are somewhat selective with 
respect to external connexions, with the aim of 
safeguarding important objectives such as 
those involving technological patterns, em-
ployment and consumption, or with regard to 
goals like decreasing the influence of the cen-
tres, which has largely characterized the in-
dustrialization of the periphery, and specifical-
ly of Latin America. 
Thus, these currents of thought are less 
concerned, for example, with disparate indus-
trial growth or asymmetrical trade than with the 
domestic dynamism and social problems which 
go beyond simple employment. 
One of the most refined expressions of 
these positions is the 'endogenous' industrial-
ization strategy proposed by UNIDO for the 
Third World,30 "which would anticipate the 
population's needs in general and seek to tailor 
the industrial production structure to produce 
goods to fulfil these needs... By definition, the 
dynamics of growth would come from within 
the country, calling for a much greater empha-
sis on self-help or self-reliance. In carrying out 
this strategy, income would also be generated 
directly in the hands of the rural and urban poor 
to help them to satisfy their minimum needs for 
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education 
and transportation. Projects would stress a low 
30TJNIDO, Industry 2000 - New Perspectives, United 
Nations, New York, 1979, pp. 77-79. 
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capital-labour ratio, use less energy and en-
courage greater use of local skills, entrepre-
neurial resources, materials, capital goods and 
technology ... The strategy would involve an 
expanded role for small and medium industry... 
[and] a symbiotic interaction between farms 
and industrial enterprises at the rural level 
leading to greater equality in the rural-urban 
terms of trade... [It] would call for a positive 
economic role for the goverment, particularly 
through the creation of enterprises producing 
not only industrial, but also public goods... The 
endogenous industrialization strategy is not to 
be equated with a closed door policy or autarky. 
The exchange of goods and services interna-
tionally is assumed to constitute an important 
element in the process of development... al-
though care would be given to fitting the flows 
of finance, technology, and imported materials 
and components to the productive structure 
deemed most suited for furthering the social 
objectives of the developing countries. Within 
this strategy based on human needs, stress is 
placed on the role of industrial development in 
alleviating the conditions of poverty". 
Clearly the most definitely or explicitly 
inward-oriented strategies are not only dif-
ferent from those found in the previous scena-
rios with respect to external relations, indus-
try's connexion with the primary sectors or 
social priorities: they also include easily 
visualized and distinctive policies. They differ 
least, perhaps, from the position oriented to-
wards the norm, which is most exacting with 
regard to indigenous and collective efforts, 
thus implying a certain selective 'delinking' 
and the limiting of non-essential consumption 
needs within the framework of fairer distribu-
tion policies. They are also fairly close to the 
position based on the ideas being discussed 
regarding the new International Development 
Strategy. But they are very far removed from 
the position which depends upon the industrial 
possibilities involved in the trends towards 
world economic restructuring, and even more 
so from the trend to economic openness as 
described earlier. Inward-oriented strategies 
are at one political extreme, and at the other is 
openness, defined by the free play of market 
forces. 
It is curious to note that a number of 
representatives of developed countries have 
expressed enthusiasm for inward-oriented 
strategies. This may perhaps be explained by a 
certain desire to alleviate the constant pres-
sures from the periphery for co-operation. 
Enthusiasm is also being expressed for indige-
nous and collective efforts involving integra-
tionist ideas, perhaps for the same reason. Such 
enthusiasm, however, is inconsistent with the 
political stances of the developed market 
economies and their frequent recommenda-
tions regarding economic openness, which in 
turn are not consistent with their own increas-
ingly protectionist strategies. 
At the same time, however, inward-orien-
ted strategies frequently also take account of 
the advantages of full incorporation into the 
world economy and the benefits to be provided 
by international economic restructuring, either 
that which is tending to be implemented or that 
which the countries are trying to negotiate to 
further the development and industrialization 
of the Third World. They thus draw upon 
elements contained in other schemes, as is very 
apparent in the case of UNIDO's endogenous 
strategy, which fits in quite explicitly with the 
ideas forming the New International Economic 
Order, and which proposes concerted indus-
trial redeployment. In other cases, industrial 
redeployment is viewed only as a result of the 
attempt by transnational corporations to reap 
greater profits in an atmosphere of liberalized 
international trade. 
